Noncompete agreements are widely used by employers to limit workers’ ability to compete with their former employer during or after employment.  Employers use these agreements in a heavy-handed effort to control and constrain employees’ freedom to pursue better employment elsewhere.  Studies have shown that noncompetes suppress wages, hamper innovation, and block entrepreneurs from starting new businesses.[1]  Noncompete agreements compound the power imbalances employees already face in relationships with their employers, and they exist only to protect employers.

Even though an estimated 30 million workers—nearly one in five Americans—are subject to a noncompete, the opaque and legalistic nature of these agreements make it hard for workers to know how they operate and how they are enforced.  This guide is intended to serve as a primer for workers and attorneys alike to better understand (1) the history of noncompetes in the United States legal system, (2) the current status of federal restrictions on noncompetes, and (3) the landscape of various state restrictions and bans of noncompetes.

Brief History of Noncompete Agreements in the United States

The first known English common law case involving a noncompete agreement arose in 1414.  In Dyer’s Case, an apprentice, John Dyer, had promised to refrain from his trade for six months in the town in which he had been trained, and the master tradesman sought to enforce the restriction but did not show up for the hearing.  The judge refused to enforce the noncompete.  See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 Hastings L.J. 441, 455 n.33 (2001).  But two hundred years later, in 1621, a court enforced a noncompete that was limited in geographic scope.  Broad v. Jollyffe, Cro. Jac. 596, Noy 98; see Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. 51, 53 (1837) (citing Broad v. Jollyffe).

Over the past two hundred years, United States federal and state laws have developed to regulate enforcement of noncompete agreements.  Some states, such as California, have effectively banned noncompete agreements for over 150 years.  It is no coincidence that California has seen more than a century of enhanced economic development, wage growth, innovation, entrepreneurship, and competition in the years following its enactment of its broad noncompete ban in 1872.  However, California’s approach is not the norm, and indeed most states have permitted noncompetes with few, if any, restrictions, until the past twenty years or so.

Around 2007, in the midst of the technology boom, several states began to make the first of several significant changes to their noncompete laws.  In 2007, Oregon passed a law permitting noncompetes only if the employee earned above a minimum compensation threshold and providing that, for employees earning below the minimum compensation threshold, employers must compensate employees during the period of the noncompete.  And in 2009, Massachusetts and Georgia passed bills to ban or limit noncompete agreements.  These legislative actions were featured in state news stories because they were novel at the time.

But it was not until 2014, when Jimmy John’s made national news because it required its sandwich makers to sign noncompetes, that the nation’s attention was captured.  People were incensed that sub sandwich makers, or other low-paid or entry-level workers, could be prohibited from working at other similar fast food chains due to restrictive noncompetes.  The Jimmy John’s news led state attorneys general in Illinois and New York to each pursue and ultimately settle with Jimmy John’s and to then pursue similar abusive uses of noncompete agreements.

Many researchers credit the 2014 Jimmy John’s news with spurring states, researchers, attorneys general, and employees nationwide to “wake up” to the oppressive nature of noncompetes and to push for reform across the country.  Something about applying noncompetes to sandwich makers helped many to recognize the one-sided and inherently employer-friendly nature of noncompete agreements.

In the past eleven years, researchers have published dozens of articles exploring the impact of noncompetes on wage growth, entrepreneurship, innovation, labor mobility, and competition.  Relying on this surge of research, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) introduced in 2023 and implemented in 2024 a Rule that would ban noncompetes nationwide; all fifty states have imposed some sort of bans or restriction on noncompete agreements; and more than thirty-five states have introduced bills in the past two years that would further restrict their use.  This groundswell of criticism of noncompetes has continued through today, despite legal challenges that have prevented the FTC Rule banning noncompetes nationwide from going into effect (see below).

Indeed, in spite of setbacks impacting the enforcement of the FTC ban and the current unlikelihood of federal legislation instituting a nationwide ban of noncompetes, state legislatures across the country have passed or are considering noncompete bans of varying severity.  In 2024, there were 70 noncompete bills in consideration in 31 states, and thus far in 2025 there are at least 75 noncompete bills pending in 35 states.

Current Status of Federal Restrictions of Noncompete Agreements

FTC’s Rule Banning Noncompetes

On January 5, 2023, the FTC announced a proposed rule which would ban noncompetes nationwide.  During the next few months, and as required by law, the FTC provided for a “Notice and Comment” period during which interested parties and the general public could respond to all parts of the proposed rule’s solicitation of public comments.  Comments were placed on a publicly accessible website (at https://www.regulations.gov).

Following the close of the Notice and Comment period, the FTC issued a final rule on April 23, 2024.  The final rule largely tracked the proposed rule, with some modifications, including to the definition of a noncompete clause.  Under the final rule, a “non-compete clause” is defined as a term or condition of employment that either “prohibits” a worker from, “penalizes” a worker for, or “functions to prevent” a worker from (A) seeking or accepting work in the United States with a different person where such work would begin after the conclusion of the employment that includes the term or condition; or (B) operating a business in the United States after the conclusion of the employment that includes the term or condition.

Importantly, the FTC’s term “functions to prevent” could apply the FTC final rule’s ban on noncompetes to other types of restrictive employment agreements, such as nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”), Training Repayment Agreement Provisions (“TRAPs”), or non-solicitation agreements.  Those types of agreements do not by their terms prohibit workers from or penalize workers for seeking or accepting other work after they leave their job, and in many cases may not have that functional effect.  But the FTC final rule’s term “functions to prevent” clarifies that, if an employer adopts a term or condition that is so broad or onerous that it has the same functional effect as a term prohibiting or penalizing a worker from seeking or accepting other work after the worker’s employment ends, such a term is a noncompete clause, and is thus prohibited.

If the FTC final rule ever goes into effect, employers and workers both may still face confusion about whether contractual terms in non-solicitation and nondisclosure agreements will fall under the FTC’s noncompete ban.  Many non-solicitation agreements limit former workers from working with any former or potential clients of the former employer.  This often has the same impact as a noncompete, especially in certain fields such as sales, and is particularly unfair to former workers who brought their clients to the former employer in the first place.  As written, the final rule’s “functions to prevent” term may well ban those restrictions on workers.

Litigation Enjoining Enforcement of the FTC Rule

The FTC indicated in both its proposed rule and final rule that it anticipated numerous legal challenges.  Indeed, it provided hundreds of pages of arguments and responses to comments attacking its legal authority to issue such an expansive rule.  Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the FTC’s rule will withstand legal challenges, especially given that the Supreme Court recently overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which had held that courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, holding instead in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, that an agency’s interpretation where the law is ambiguous is not entitled to deference.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce intervened in the first major legal challenge to the FTC rule filed on May 9, 2024, arguing that the FTC did not have the authority to issue rules that define unlawful methods of competition.  See Ryan LLC v. FTC, No. 3:24-cv-00986-E (N.D. Tex.).  The district court, the Northern District of Texas, granted summary judgment, thereby prohibiting the FTC from enforcing the rule nationwide.  See 2024 WL 3879954 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2024).  The FTC appealed to the Fifth Circuit, but as of the date of this posting, there has yet to be a Circuit ruling on the matter.

The major argument against the FTC noncompete ban is that the FTC lacks the substantive rulemaking authority to preclude unfair methods of competition.  The Northern District of Texas, in its order granting summary judgment, stated:

Plainly read, the Court concludes the FTC has some authority to promulgate rules to preclude unfair methods of competition.  Indeed, the Act alludes to this power in Section 18.  See 15 U.S.C. § 57a. However, after reviewing the text, structure, and history of the Act, the Court concludes the FTC lacks the authority to create substantive rules through this method.

Given that the Fifth Circuit has yet to issue an order on the FTC’s appeal, the Northern District of Texas’ injunction will remain in place unless the Circuit overturns it, and the FTC is presently prohibited from enforcing its new rule nationwide.

FTC and Noncompetes under the Trump Administration

By statute, the FTC is headed by five Commissioners, no more than three of whom can represent the political party in power.  With Trump’s abrupt March 18 removal of the two Democratic Commissioners, Alvaro Bedoya and Rebecca Slaughter, and with the addition of Trump’s nominee Mark Meador, three Commissioners remain: now-Chair Andrew Ferguson, Melissa Holyoak, and Mark Meador, all Republicans.  Many expected that the Trump administration’s FTC would oppose the Biden administration’s FTC nationwide ban, especially after Trump removed the two Democratic Commissioners.  But recent statements by the FTC’s newly-appointed Chair indicate that the FTC’s scrutiny of noncompete agreements is not over: Chair Ferguson announced the formation of a Joint Labor Task Force to investigate and prosecute unfair, deceptive, and anticompetitive labor market conduct, and listed as an example of unfair methods of competition “non-compete agreements.”  Chair Ferguson emphasized that the Joint Labor Task Force “will scrutinize noncompete agreements.”  These statements are a dramatic departure from Chair Ferguson’s dissenting statement against the FTC’s ban on noncompete agreements.

Newly-appointed Mark Meador, filling the third Republican seat on the Commission, similarly indicated that the FTC should focus on noncompetes, adding that they have been “overused and abused.”  However, he emphasized that the FTC should use its “traditional enforcement powers” to address the harms of noncompete agreements, indicating that the FTC will likely not use rulemaking to outlaw noncompetes, but will nonetheless pursue them.

Ultimately, despite a change in leadership, the FTC appears focused on addressing noncompete agreements, although not likely through rulemaking.  The actual level of scrutiny the FTC will employ, however, remains to be seen.

Status of Federal Law Restricting Noncompetes

Given the Supreme Court’s recent Loper Bright decision ruling that an agency’s interpretation where the law is ambiguous is not  entitled to  deference, and given the political climate, it is unlikely that administrative rulemaking will be an effective path for escalating restrictions on noncompetes.  Another path to a nationwide ban, however, is for Congress to pass legislation restricting or banning noncompetes.

In 2023, Senators Murphy (D-Conn) and Young (R-Ind) introduced the Workforce Mobility Act.  See S. 220, 118th Cong. (2023) (previously introduced in 2019 and 2021).  If passed, this law would largely ban the use of noncompete agreements nationwide, permitting them only for limited exceptions such as in the case of the dissolution of a partnership or sale of a business, and clarifying that nothing would preclude parties from contracting to protect from the disclosure of trade secrets.  The law would direct the FTC and Department of Labor to enforce the law, would empower State Attorneys General to enforce it at the state level, and would create a private right of action.  Importantly, the law’s ban would apply retroactively.

Given that the bill was introduced in February 2023 and that no further action has been taken, the chances of this bill being passed soon are slim, but hopefully Senators Murphy and Young, or others, will re-introduce it soon.

State Survey of Current Restrictions of Noncompete Agreements

Over the past three years alone, more than 150 bills have been introduced in more than 35 states restricting noncompetes to at least some degree.  Many states have adopted an incremental approach, passing a bill every few years or so implementing further restrictions on noncompetes; while others, like California, adopted a comprehensive noncompete ban from the start.  Keeping up with the constantly-changing landscape of state noncompete law is a challenging task, and this blog is by no means intended to serve as a fifty-state survey of existing laws and pending bills.  Instead, this blog describes a few of the categories of commonly-seen restrictions on noncompetes across the states.

Total Bans

The simplest type of noncompete restriction is a total ban.  Six states so far have instituted total bans (CA, MN, MT, ND, OK, WY), and several legislatures are considering them.

State Spotlight: California

California, which has effectively banned noncompetes for over 150 years, has the broadest noncompete.  Its statute broadly prohibits agreements that restrain California employees from engaging in any lawful profession, trade, or business, subject to very limited exceptions, mostly in the context of the sale of a business (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 – 16602.5, latest amendments effective January 1, 2024).  Even if one of the narrow exceptions applies, the scope of the restrictive agreement must be reasonable both in geographic scope and duration.

As of January 1, 2024, California’s amendments went into effect, providing that “any contract that is void under this chapter is unenforceable regardless of where and when the contract was signed.”  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600.5.  More specifically, the 2024 amendment states that the employer or former employer may not attempt to enforce such void contracts “regardless of whether the contract was signed and the employment was maintained outside of California.”  The new law thereby invalidates noncompetition agreements or other restrictive covenants to enforce the agreements – even when employees entered into the agreements outside California in a state where the competition restrictions are lawful.

Likely passed in response to California employers’ attempts to continue to force employees to sign unenforceable noncompetes, the 2024 amendment also states that an employer that either enters into a contract with a void noncompete agreement or attempts to enforce such a void agreement, “commits a civil violation.”  Finally, it provides that employees, former employees, or prospective employees may bring private, civil actions for injunctive relief or actual damages, and be entitled to recover attorney fees and costs.  In other words, the new law has teeth: employees can sue their employers for damages if the employer tries to enforce a void noncompete.

Shortly after the new provisions took effect, an employee sued his employer for enforcing a noncompete provision, and the employer has defended against his suit by challenging the constitutionality of the new law. The employee sought to apply California law, which would have concluded that the noncompete was unenforceable even though it was signed in another state; and the employee sought to apply Massachusetts law.  The employer won: DraftKings Inc. v. Hermalyn, 118 F.4th 416 (1st Cir. Sept. 26, 2024).  The extent to which the 2024 amendments to the California noncompete ban will be widely enforceable against noncompetes signed in other jurisdictions remains to be seen.

State Spotlight: Minnesota

Minnesota law completely bans noncompetes.  (Minn. Stat. § 181.988, effective July 1, 2023).  The statute clarifies that “employee” includes “independent contractors,” but the noncompete ban does not restrict non-solicitation agreements, nondisclosure agreements, or agreements designed to protect trade secrets or confidential information.  Indeed, many state statutes banning or restricting noncompetes clarify that the noncompete ban/restrictions are not intended to ban or restrict non-solicitation agreements or other, specified, types of restrictive covenants.

Wage Thresholds

One of the most common types of laws restricting noncompetes is one that imposes wage thresholds below which employees are protected from noncompetes.  Twelve states (CO; D.C.; IL; ME; MD; MA; NV; NH; OR; RI; VA; and WA) have some sort of wage threshold noncompete ban.

Defined Wage Threshold

Many states with wage threshold noncompete bans implement a defined wage threshold beyond which noncompetes are permitted, with restrictions such as reasonable time, geographic area, and scope, sometimes set by statute and sometimes set by caselaw.  Most states with wage threshold bans increase this defined threshold annually linked to inflation or other metrics; few states increase the defined threshold periodically.

State Spotlight: Oregon

For example, Oregon’s wage threshold law (RCW §§ 49.62.005 – .900), which went into effect on January 1, 2020, bans noncompetes for employees making less than $100,000 annually.  Further, Oregon’s law bans noncompetes for independent contractors unless their earnings from the party seeking enforcement exceed $250,000 annually.  The law, which is not retroactive, provides that these annual income figures are adjusted annually for inflation.  The wage threshold in 2025 is approximately $116,427.

State Spotlight: Illinois

Meanwhile, Illinois’ wage threshold law (820 ILCS §§ 90/1 et seq.) went into effect ton January 1, 2022 and bans noncompetes for workers who make less than $75,000 annually, with the threshold increasing at regular intervals (“This amount shall increase to $80,000 per year beginning on January 1, 2027, $85,000 per year beginning on January 1, 2032, and $90,000 per year beginning on January 1, 2037.”).

Average Earnings Wage Threshold

Another approach to a wage threshold noncompete is to tie the threshold to average wages in the nation, state, or county, or some other metric in federal law.  The benefit of this method is that the wage threshold will increase along with federal, state, or local wages; the weakness is that state or nationwide minimum wages, and other statutorily-defined wage thresholds, are not typically increased at the same pace as inflation, and so the ban will meaningfully protect fewer and fewer workers over time.

State Spotlight: Virginia

Virginia’s wage threshold law (Va. Code § 40.1-28.7:8, amendment goes into effect July 1, 2025), bans noncompetes for “low-wage employees,” defined as employees whose average weekly earnings are less than the average weekly wage in Virginia, or those who are entitled to overtime compensation under 29 U.S.C. § 207.  In defining “low-wage employees” in this way, Virginia has tied the threshold for the noncompete ban to statewide wages and to federal law.  The state just passed a new law, S.B. 1218, 2025 Va. Laws Ch. 585, which bans noncompetes for employees entitled to overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, regardless of their weekly income; this law will go into effect July 1, 2025.

State Spotlight: Rhode Island

Rhode Island’s wage threshold law (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-59-1 – 3), which went into effect January 15, 2020, prohibits noncompetes for employees entitled to overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as for low-wage employees whose earnings are less than 250% of the federal poverty level.

Healthcare Industry Bans

The most common type of state law restricting noncompetes is a ban or restriction of noncompetes for certain, or all, healthcare professionals.  These are increasingly popular, as demonstrated by the dozens of proposed bills introduced in the past two years alone that would either introduce healthcare industry bans in states with no or few other statutory restrictions on noncompetes, or would expand the types of defined healthcare professionals benefitting from a noncompete ban.  Sixteen states currently have some type of noncompete ban or restriction benefitting healthcare professionals (AR, CT, DE, IN, IA, KY, LA, MD, MA, NH, NM, OR, PA, SD, TX).

Profession-Specific Bans

The more common type of healthcare industry noncompete ban is a total ban on certain types of healthcare professions, such as physicians, nurses, or other healthcare practitioners.

State Spotlight: Massachusetts

For example, Massachusetts broadly protects several categories of healthcare professionals from noncompetes: physicians (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 112 § 12X (1977)); nurses (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 112 § 74D (1983)); and psychologists (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 112 § 129B (Oct. 24, 2004)).

State Spotlight: Indiana

Indiana limits its noncompete ban to primary care physicians (IC § 25-22.5-5,5-2.5, effective July 1, 2023).  But the Indiana legislature recently passed a new law (S.B. 475, passed March 6, 2025), which would expand the existing primary care physician ban to include all physicians.

Profession-Specific Wage Thresholds and Restrictions

Another common approach to healthcare industry restrictions on noncompetes is to either ban noncompetes for certain healthcare practitioners below a defined wage threshold (distinct from the general wage threshold ban discussed above in Part III.A), or to define in the statute the conditions a noncompete must meet in order to be enforceable for specified groups of healthcare practitioners.  Some states have passed laws that are a combination of these two approaches.

State Spotlight: District of Columbia

Instead of banning noncompetes broadly for all medical specialists, the District of Columbia implements a wage threshold ban specific to medical specialists.  Specifically, D.C. law bans noncompetes for medical specialists earning less than $250,000 annually as of October 1, 2022, with the annual threshold increasing annually beginning in 2024, as described in the statute (D.C. Code. § 32-581.01 – 32-581.05, effective September 1, 2022).  “Medical specialists” are defined as those who hold a license to practice medicine, are a physician, and have completed their medical residency.  In addition to a medical specialist-specific wage threshold ban, D.C. law bans noncompetes in general for workers earning less than $150,000 annually (also increasing on an annual basis as defined in the statute, and approximately $158,364 in 2025).

Beyond just banning noncompetes for medical specialists who earn less than the annual wage threshold defined in the statute, D.C. law provides that, for medical specialists who earn more than $250,000 annually (as of 2024, approximately $257,000, pursuant to the statutorily-defined annual wage threshold increase), for a noncompete to be enforceable, the agreement must specify the functional scope of the restriction “including what services, roles, industry, or competing entities the employee is restricted from performing work in or on behalf of,” geographical limitations, and must not exceed two years in duration, among other statutory requirements.

State Spotlight: Maryland

Like D.C., Maryland implements a healthcare industry wage threshold ban on noncompetes distinct from its general wage threshold ban.  In general, Maryland provides that noncompetes may not be enforced against low-wage workers earning less than 150% of the state minimum wage ($46,800 in 2024) (Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716, effective October 1, 2023).  Healthcare providers, defined as those that provide direct patient care and are required to be licensed under the Maryland Health Occupations Article, who earn equal to or less than $350,000 annually, may similarly not be subject to noncompetes.  In Maryland, healthcare providers who earn more than $350,000 annually may be subjected to noncompetes if they do not exceed one year from the last day of employment and do not exceed a geographical restriction of 10 miles from the primary place of employment.  See Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716, effective June 1, 2024, but affecting agreements executed on or after July 1, 2025.

Industry Bans

While the most common type of industry-specific noncompete bans target the healthcare industry, seven states have implemented noncompete bans or restrictions affecting non-healthcare industries, namely veterinarians or broadcasters (DC, HI, LA, ME, MD, MA, UT).

State Spotlight: District of Columbia

The District of Columbia recently instituted a blanket ban for broadcast employees, regardless of their annual compensation (D.C. Code. § 32-581.01 – 32-581.05, effective September 1, 2022).  Broadcast employees are defined as an “on- or off-air creator (such as an anchor, disc jockey, editor, producer, program host, reporter, or writer) of a legal entity that owns or operates a TV, radio, cable, or other broadcast station or network, including satellite-based services similar to a broadcast station or network.

State Spotlight: Utah

Utah does not broadly ban noncompetes for broadcast employees, but instead implements a combination of restrictions for broadcast employees who make more, or less, than a defined wage threshold. (Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-51-101 – 301, effective May 10, 2016).  For broadcast employees making less than $913 per week or who qualify for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Utah permits noncompetes for up to one year; for those who make more than that wage threshold, Utah law defines the conditions the noncompete must meet in order to be enforceable, including requiring it to be “of reasonable duration” and based on industry standards.”  Broadcast employees are defined as those engaged in the business of “distributing or transmitting electronic or electromagnetic signals to the general public” using television, cable, or radio, or preparing, developing, or creating one or more programs by those means.

State Spotlight: Hawai‘i

Hawai‘i law bans noncompetes for all employees “of a technology business.”  (Haw. Rev. Stat. 480-4(d), effective January 1, 2015), which in turn is defined as a trade or business that derives the majority of its gross income from the sale or license of products or services “resulting from its software development or information technology development, or both,” and excludes businesses considered part of the broadcast industry or telecommunications carriers.

State Spotlight: Maryland

Maryland law reflects a growing trend to ban noncompetes for veterinarians or vet techs: Maryland bans noncompetes restricting both types of employees.  (Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-716, effective June 1, 2024).

Protectable Interests

The last category of noncompete state statutes are those that do not ban, or arguably meaningfully restrict noncompetes, but instead merely define the “protectable interests” upon which an employer may justify a noncompete and/or specify the categories courts should consider when determining whether a noncompete is enforceable.  Eight states have “protectable interest” statutes outlining considerations for courts examining the enforceability of noncompete agreements (AL, FL, GA, ID, MI, MS, NC, WI).

State Spotlight: Wisconsin

 Wisconsin law provides that noncompetes are only permitted if the restrictions on employment are reasonably necessary to protect the employer and do not unreasonably restrain the employee.  Wis. Stat. Ann. § 103.465, amended March 2, 2016.

State Spotlight: Georgia

Georgia law provides that noncompete agreements are permissible if they serve a legitimate business interest, and if they are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities, but are void if they are not supported by a “legitimate business interest.”  Ga. Code Ann. §§ 13-8-50 – 59 (May 11, 2011).

Penalties

Some of the state statutes limiting or banning noncompetes do not specify penalties for violation; but many do.  A few examples are listed below:

• Colorado: penalty of $5,000 for each worker or prospective worker, injunctive relief, and actual damages; employer may also be required to pay reasonable costs and attorney fees, Rev. Stat § 8-2-113;
• District of Columbia: penalty of no less than $350 and no more than $1,000 for each violation; if agreement was entered into after non-compete ban went into effect on October 1, 2022 or if highly compensated employee’s employer failed to give notice of non-compete ban, penalty of not less than $1,000, C. Code § 32-581.04;
• Illinois: penalty not to exceed $5,000 for each violation, or $10,000 for each repeat violation within a 5-year period, 820 ILCS § 90/1;
• Maine: penalty of not less than $5,000, 26 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 599-A;
• Virginia: civil penalties of $250 for second violation and $1,000 for third and each subsequent violation, plus attorneys fees, fees for expert witness(es), and costs, Code § 40.1-28.7:8; and
• Washington: penalty of $5,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs, RCW §§ 49.62.005 – 900.

[1] See, e.g., Matthew Johnson, Kurt Lavetti, and Michael Lipsitz, The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility 2 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455381 (finding that a nationwide ban on noncompetes would increase average earnings by 3.3–13.9%); Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norm Bishara, The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts, 36 J.L., Econ., and Org. 633, 652 (2020) (finding that having a noncompete clause was associated with a 35% decrease in the likelihood a worker would leave for a competitor); Sampsa Samila and Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 Mgmt. Sci. 425, 432 (2011) (finding that when noncompete clauses were more enforceable, rates of entrepreneurship, patenting, and employment growth slow).