Quick Hits

• The Supreme Court ruled that a retired firefighter with Parkinson’s disease could not bring claims under the ADA regarding changes to her post-employment health benefits.
• The Court held that Title I of the ADA requires plaintiffs to have or desire a job for which they can perform the essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation at the time of an employer’s allegedly discriminatory actions.
• The decision clarifies a circuit split by concluding that to have standing under the ADA, plaintiffs must hold or desire a job for which they can perform essential functions, thereby narrowing protections for retired employees.
• Justice Neil Gorsuch further opined that retired employees may be able to proceed with ADA claims if they allege that they were disabled before retiring and were subject to the alleged discriminatory decision.

In a mixed ruling in Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida, the Supreme Court affirmed a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that a former firefighter who took an early disability retirement was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA since she could not perform essential job functions even with a reasonable accommodation.

The Supreme Court held that to prevail in a claim under Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12112(a), plaintiffs “must plead and prove” that they have a job or desire a job for which they can perform the essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation at the time of the alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

The ruling addressed a circuit split where the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s position, while the Second and Third Circuits held that former employees do not lose standing under the ADA simply because they are no longer are employed.

Background

Karyn Stanley, who served as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, for nearly two decades, was forced to take an early disability retirement in 2018 at the age of forty-seven after she developed Parkinson’s disease. (Later-developed facts indicate that Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2016).

When she was hired in 1999, the city offered health insurance until age sixty-five for employees with at least twenty-five years of service or who retired earlier due to disability. However, in 2003, the city changed the policy to only provide health insurance coverage twenty-four months after an early disability retirement.

Stanley sued the city in 2020, alleging that the change unlawfully discriminated against individuals with disabilities in violation of Title I of the ADA. The Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city, finding that she did not have standing to sue under the ADA since she was no longer a “qualified individual.”

Qualified Individual

The Supreme Court found that the former firefighter lacked standing based on the text of Title I. Specifically, Title I of the ADA Section 12112(a) prohibits discrimination against “qualified individual[s],” a term that is defined elsewhere in Title I as individuals “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual[s] hold[] or desire[].”

In the Court’s opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch stated that the “present-tense verbs” in the law “tend to suggest that the statute does not reach retirees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged act of discrimination.” The Court rejected the argument that the former firefighter’s claims should continue since she is suing about discrimination in compensation that affected her in retirement.

Section 12112(a) “does not protect ‘compensation’ as such,” Justice Gorsuch said in the Court’s opinion. “Instead, it bars employers from ‘discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to … compensation.’ … In other words, the statute protects people, not benefits, from discrimination.” (Emphasis added in the opinion).

The Court further rejected arguments that it should look beyond the text of Section 12112(a) or analyze it in the context of the broader purposes of the ADA, stating “we cannot say Title I’s textual limitations necessarily clash with the ADA’s broader purposes.”

However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson criticized the Court’s holding as a “counterintuitive conclusion.” She argued that the Court’s opinion “overlooks both the actual facts presented in this case and the clear design of the ADA to render a ruling that plainly counteracts what Congress meant to—and did—accomplish.”

Subject to Discriminatory Compensation Decision

Still, Justice Gorsuch opined in a section with which a majority of justices did not agree, that the firefighter might have been able to proceed with her ADA claims if she had alleged that she suffered from the disability before retiring and worked for some period of time with the disability.

While facts emerged following the filing of her suit, i.e., that she was diagnosed with Parkinson’s in 2016 nearly two years before retiring, that fact was not alleged in her complaint. Since the case before the Court was based on a motion to dismiss, Justice Gorsuch declined to consider such later-developed facts. Still, Justice Gorsuch suggested “future plaintiffs—or perhaps even Ms. Stanley herself in a future proceeding—” could proceed with such claims.

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s holding narrows ADA standing for retired employees, rejecting the approaches by the Second and Third Circuits that former employees do not necessarily lose their right to pursue an ADA claim. Instead, the Court’s holding requires ADA plaintiffs have a job and have a disability at the time of an employer’s alleged disability-based discrimination. However, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion suggests there still could be a window for retired employees to bring suit over past allegedly discriminatory decisions if they allege that they were disabled before retiring and were subject to the alleged discriminatory decision.