I recently commented on the discussion of possible damage theories posited by Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster in Palkon v. Maffei, 311 A.3d 255 (Del. Ch. 2024). A commenter on my post noted that the Court discussed damages as an adequate remedy of law in order to hold that injunctive relief was not a reasonably conceivable remedy.

The Court was not ruling on the plaintiffs' request for an injunction. Rather, the Court was deciding the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, the only question to be decided by the Court was whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim on which relief could be granted.

Injunctive relief is a remedy not a claim. In fact, the Vice Chancellor acknowledged that assessing remedies at the motion to dismiss stage is "usually premature":

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges whether a plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief could be granted. The motion does not target the types of relief that a plaintiff might obtain. A court determines remedies after trial, so a pleading-stage assessment is usually premature. (footnote omitted)

In this case, however, the Vice Chancellor found that "ruling at the pleading stage on whether a remedy will be available can assist in the simplification of the case and the formulating of issues for trial, which are important parts of the trial court's case-management function" (footnote omitted). The Court then provides two different possible ways to measure monetary damages. 

In my own view, it was unnecessary to address the question of injunctive relief once the Court had concluded that the plaintiff had stated a claim. If the Court nevertheless believed that it was necessary to address the question, it could have simply said that it could craft a monetary remedy without providing theories as to how calculate those damages. By providing possible theories of damage calculations, the Court could be viewed as providing a roadmap to the plaintiffs when the case goes to trial.