/>iSo just yesterday I covered the ridiculous story of AT&T being banned by a federal court from pursuing arbitration against a TCPA plaintiff.
Well today I have the opposite story– Sofi easily gliding to victory in a TCPA suit by effectively enforcing an arbitration provision.
In Agha v. Sofi Lending Corp. 2024 WL 1158406 (N.D. Ill. March 18, 2024) the Plaintiff sued Sofi for allegedly sending him unwanted text message solicitations. But there was no dispute Plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate with Sofi any claim:
arising out of or related to (i) my registration on SoFi’s website, (ii) my submission of information to SoFi in connection with any non-mortgage loan offered by SoFi, (iii) my application for any non-mortgage loan offered by SoFi, (iv) my participation in SoFi’s career services or entrepreneur program, or (v) the disclosures provided to me by SoFi in connection with any non-mortgage loan product that SoFi offers.
Plaintiff did not dispute entering into the agreement but he disputed his TCPA claim fit within the parameters of this arbitration provision.
The Court disagreed.
Noting the strong policy favoring arbitration, the Court determined TCPA claims do fit within the Sofi disclosure:
The issue before this Court is simple: Do Agha’s TCPA and ICFA claims, based on SoFi’s 2022 and 2023 marketing text messages, fall within the scope of the his agreement to arbitrate “any claim, dispute or controversy arising out of or related to … (ii) [his] submission of information to SoFi in connection with any non-mortgage loan offered by SoFi [or] … (v) the disclosures provided to [him] by SoFi in connection with any non mortgage loan offered by SoFi?” The Court finds that they do.
Agha alleges that SoFi violated the TCPA by sending him text messages even though he is on the National Do Not Call Registry, and that SoFi violated ICFA because it sent text messages “contrary to the TCPA.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 44.) In other words, Agha alleges that SoFi obtained and used his personal contact information without sending the proper disclosures and securing the proper consent. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b) (prohibiting certain telemarketing done without express consent); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (same). This dispute undoubtedly “arises out of or is related to” Agha’s submission of his phone number to, and his receipt of and response to disclosures from, SoFi. Indeed, one of SoFi’s disclosures referenced in the Agreement is explicitly related to the TCPA, noting that consumers “may revoke [their] consent to phone calls” by “changing [their] TCPA Consent preference” on SoFi’s website. (Dkt. 18-1, Ex. E.)
Interesting no?
Because Sofi’s calls followed Plaintiff providing his information to Sofi and Sofi sending disclosures related to the TCPA the court found the claims at issue arose out of such provision of information and disclosures.
While I love the result here, I have to admit I think reasonable minds can differ.
For instance in the case we covered yesterday the arbitration provision as broad enough to cover all disputes and claims, regardless of how they arose. Yet this provision covers only claims arising out of the use of the website and provision of personal information. The one seems broad enough to cover TCPA claims no problem. The other… maybe.
The difference in the two cases, of course, is in the formation of the agreement to arbitrate. Sofi had NO problem providing an agreement to arbitrate existed–it was just an issue of scope. AT&T, on the other hand, could not prove Starling entered into an agreement to arbitrate to begin with–so the broad scope of the provision did it no good.
