California’s 2019 Legislative Session has concluded. The Legislature adjourned in the early morning hours of September 14 and Governor Gavin Newsom completed his review of the 1,042 bills sent to his desk on October 13. The following is a review. 

California Extends Limitations Period for Employment Discrimination Claims

AB 9 (Reyes) was enacted as Chapter 709 on October 10, 2019. This bill extends to 3 years the statute of limitations for complaints alleging employment discrimination. It specifies the operative date of the verified complaint is the date that the intake form was filed with the Labor Commissioner.¹

The bill also makes conforming changes to current provisions that grant a person allegedly aggrieved by an unlawful practice who first obtains knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice after the expiration of the limitations period.

AB 9 provides that complaints alleging a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act² shall not be filed after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.³ However, a complaint alleging any other violation of Article 1 of Chapter 6⁴ shall not be filed after the expiration of three years from the date upon which the unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.⁵ 

Finally, this bill prohibits its provisions from being interpreted to revive lapsed claims.⁶

California Attempts to Ban Employment Arbitration Agreements

AB 51 (Gonzalez) was enacted as Chapter 711 on October 10, 2019. Section One of the bill provides uncodified statements of legislative intent.⁷

Section Two of the bill adds a new provision to the law proclaiming that “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to violate Section 432.6 of the Labor Code,” which AB 51 adds to the law.⁸  As such, any violation of the prohibition regarding pre-dispute arbitration would be deemed an unlawful employment practice under California Fair Employment and Housing Act⁹ (FEHA), which provides a number of remedies, including injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.

Section Three of the bill adds an entirely new section to the Labor Code.¹⁰ This new law prohibits a person from requiring any applicant for employment or any employee to waive any right, forum, or procedure for a violation of any provision of FEHA or other specific statutes governing employment as a condition of employment, continued employment, or the receipt of any employment-related benefit.¹¹

This prohibition includes the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with or notify any state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity of any alleged violation.¹² The law also prohibits an employer from threatening, retaliating or discriminating against, or terminating any applicant for employment or any employee because of the refusal to consent to the waiver of any right, forum, or procedure for a violation of specific statutes governing employment.¹³

In addition, the law states that an agreement that requires an employee to opt out of a waiver or take any affirmative action in order to preserve their rights is deemed a condition of employment.¹⁴  In terms of enforcement, in addition to injunctive relief and any other remedies available, a court may award a prevailing plaintiff enforcing their rights under this section reasonable attorney’s fees.¹⁵

There is one exception to this prohibition for persons registered with a self-regulatory organization as defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934¹⁶  or regulations adopted under that act pertaining to any requirement of a self-regulatory organization that a person arbitrate disputes that arise between the person and their employer or any other person as specified by the rules of the self-regulatory organization.¹⁷

A statement is included in the bill that “nothing in this section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.).”¹⁸

Excluded from this new law are post dispute settlement agreements and negotiated severance agreements.¹⁹  And, its provisions are prospective in nature as it applies to contracts for employment entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2020.²⁰ 

This bill also contains a severability clause. In other words, the provisions of this new section of law are severable so that, if any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.²¹ 

Statement of Legislative Intent

Assemblywoman Gonzalez submitted a letter to the Assembly Daily Journal on September 14, 2019 which reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Wilson

The purpose of this letter is to express my intent in enacting Assembly Bill 51, which prohibits California employers from forcing employees to waive their right to have certain potential legal disputes heard in the dispute resolution forum of their choice, as a condition of employment, continued employment, or the receipt of any employment-related benefit. The bill also protects California workers from retaliation if they refuse to agree to such a waiver.
The bill states that it does not apply to postdispute settlement agreements or negotiated severance agreements. It is my intent that the term “postdispute” in this context means any time after both parties are aware that an actual point of legal controversy has arisen between them. It is my intent that the term “negotiated” in this context means that the agreement is voluntary, deliberate, and informed, provides consideration of value to the employee, and that the employee is given notice and an opportunity to retain an attorney or is represented by an attorney, 

 Sincerely, 
Lorena Gonzalez, Assemblymember, 80th District

New Penalties for Failure to Pay Wages in California

AB 673 (Carrillo) was enacted as Chapter 716 on October 10, 2019. The bill contains one section which provides several amendments to Section 210 of the Labor Code. The purpose of this provision of law is to provide penalties for failure to pay wages to workers in this state. First, the bill adds a new category of failure to pay wages to being subject to a penalty.²²  Second, it removes the description of a “civil” penalty.²³ 

Third, it provides that the penalties that may be recovered under Labor Code Section 210 either by the employee as a statutory penalty²⁴ or by the Labor Commissioner as a civil penalty through a citation.²⁵  The procedures for issuing, contesting and enforcing judgments for these citations issued by the Labor Commissioner are the same as existing law²⁶.²⁷ 

Finally, the new law specifies that an employee can only recover the statutory penalty provided in Section 210 or to enforce a civil penalty under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) statute²⁸, but not both, for the same violation of the Labor Code.²⁹

New Lactation Accommodation Rules for Employers

SB 142 (Wiener) was enacted as Chapter 720 on October 10, 2019. This bill requires an employer to provide a lactation room or location that includes prescribed features and would require an employer, among other things, to provide access to a sink and refrigerator in close proximity to the employee’s workspace. The bill deems denial of reasonable break time or adequate space to express milk a failure to provide a rest period in accordance with state law.

The bill prohibits an employer from discharging, or in any other manner discriminating or retaliating against, an employee for exercising or attempting to exercise rights under these provisions and establishes remedies that include filing a complaint with the Labor Commissioner. The bill authorizes employers with fewer than 50 employees to seek an exemption from the requirements of these provisions if the employer demonstrates that the requirement posed an undue hardship by causing the employer significant difficulty or expense.

The bill requires an employer who obtains an exemption to make a reasonable effort to provide a place for an employee to express milk in private. The bill requires an employer to develop and implement a policy regarding lactation accommodation and make it available to employees.

Section One of the bill amends Labor Code Section 1030 to specify that every employer, both private and public sectors, must provide a reasonable amount of break time to accommodate an employee desiring to express breast milk for the employee’s infant child “each time the employee has need to express milk.”

Section Two of the bill amends Labor Code Section 1031. First, it eliminates the requirement that an employer shall make reasonable efforts to provide an employee with a location to express milk in private.³⁰ By striking the phrase “make reasonable efforts to,” it is now a mandate to provide.³¹ In addition, it eliminates the close proximity requirement. In other words, the bill stuck “other than a bathroom, in close proximity to the employee’s work area.”³²

SB 142 also struck the requirement that an employer who makes a temporary lactation location available to an employee shall be deemed to be in compliance with the law if specified conditions are met.³³ Instead, the law now provides that “a lactation room or location shall not be a bathroom and shall be in close proximity to the employee’s work area, shielded from view, and free from intrusion while the employee is expressing milk.”³⁴

Moreover, the bill eliminates an exception to the requirement when the employer is unable to provide a permanent lactation location because of operational, financial or space limitations.³⁵  In its place, there are new requirements that the lactation room or location must meet, including the following:

• Be safe, clean, and free of hazardous materials, as defined in Section 6382.³⁶

• Contain a surface to place a breast pump and personal items.³⁷

• Contain a place to sit.³⁸

• Have access to electricity or alternative devices, including, but not limited to, extension cords or charging stations, needed to operate an electric or battery-powered breast pump.³⁹

The employer is also required to provide access to a sink with running water, as well as a refrigerator suitable for storing milk.⁴⁰  The refrigerator and sink must be in close proximity to the employee’s workspace.⁴¹  Where a multipurpose room is used for lactation and other uses, the use of the room for lactation must take precedence over the other uses.⁴²

In dealing with a multitenant building or multiemployer worksite, an employer can comply with the requirements of the law by providing a space share among multiple employers within the building or worksite if the employer cannot provide a lactation location within the employer’s own workspace.⁴³  There is also a special rule when dealing with subcontractor’s employees.⁴⁴ 

SB 142 provides that an employer may comply with this mandate by designating a lactation location that is temporary due to operational, financial or space limitations, but these temporary spaces cannot be a bathroom and must be in close proximity to the employee’s work area.⁴⁵  Also, the temporary location must be shielded from view, free from intrusion while the employee is expressing milk, and be otherwise compliant with the remaining provisions of this law.⁴⁶ 

Finally, there is an exemption for an employer with fewer than 50 employees if this employer can demonstrate that a requirement would impose an undue hardship by causing the employer significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s business.⁴⁷  In the undue hardship is demonstrated, then the employer must make reasonable efforts to provide the employee with the use of a room or other location in close proximity to the work area for the employee to express milk.⁴⁸ 

Section Three of the bill amends Labor Code Section 1033. This section was amended to provide that a denial of reasonable break time or adequate space to express milk shall be deemed a failure to comply with Labor Code Section 226.7.⁴⁹  Thereafter, an employee may file a complaint with the Labor Commissioner⁵⁰.⁵¹ 

An employee may report a violation of this chapter to the Labor Commissioner’s field enforcement unit.⁵² And the Labor Commissioner may impose a civil penalty of $100 for each day that an employee is denied reasonable break time or adequate space to express milk.⁵³ 

Section Four of the bill adds Section 1034 to the Labor Code to require an employer to develop and implement a policy regarding lactation accommodation.⁵⁴  The policy must include specified information.⁵⁵ The employer must include the policy in an employee handbook⁵⁶ and shall distribute the policy to new employees upon hiring and when an employee inquires about parental leave⁵⁷. If an employer cannot provide break time or a location, then the employer must provide a written response to the employee.⁵⁸ 

California Bans “No-Hire” Clauses

AB 749 (Stone) was enacted as Chapter 808 on October 12, 2019. The bill adds Chapter 3.6 (commencing with Section 1002.5) is added to Title 14 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), and names it “Agreements Settling Employment Disputes.” It only adds one section to the CCP.

This bill prohibits an agreement to settle an employment dispute from containing a provision that prohibits, prevents, or otherwise restricts a settling party that is an aggrieved person from working for the employer against which the aggrieved person has filed a claim or any parent company, subsidiary, division, affiliate, or contractor of the employer.⁵⁹

The bill also clarifies that an employer and an aggrieved person are free to agree to end a current employment relationship⁶⁰, or to prohibit or otherwise restrict the settling aggrieved person from obtaining future employment with the settling employer, if the employer has made a good faith determination that the person engaged in sexual harassment or sexual assault.⁶¹ 

The bill further clarifies that an employer is not required to continue to employ or rehire a person if there is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for terminating the employment relationship or refusing to rehire the person.⁶² 

The bill provides that a provision in an agreement entered into on or after January 1, 2020, that violates this no-rehire clause prohibition is void as a matter of law and against public policy.⁶³  Finally, the bill defines three terms⁶⁴ that are used in the new statute:

“Aggrieved person” means a person who has filed a claim against the person’s employer in court, before an administrative agency, in an alternative dispute resolution forum, or through the employer’s internal complaint process.⁶⁵

“Sexual assault” means conduct that would constitute a crime under Section 243.3, 261, 262, 264.1, 286, 287, or 289 of the Penal Code, assault with the intent to commit any of those crimes, or an attempt to commit any of those crimes.⁶⁶

“Sexual harassment” has the same meaning as in subdivision (j) of Section 12940 of the Government Code.⁶⁷ 

California Allows Opt-Out of Arbitration When Fees Are Not Paid

SB 707 (Wieckowski) was enacted as Chapter 870 on October 13, 2019. In Section One of the bill, there are six legislative findings and declarations, including statements that private contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable.⁶⁸  Also, the California Supreme Court has concluded that an employee arbitration agreement cannot require the employee to bear additional expenses that would not otherwise be required in a court action.⁶⁹ 

In addition, a company’s failure to pay arbitration service provider fees hinders the efficient resolution of disputes.⁷⁰  And, a company’s strategic non-payment of fees severely prejudices the ability of employees and consumers to vindicate their rights.⁷¹ 

Two cases from the Ninth Circuit are cited regarding an employer’s refusal to pay fees or participate in arbitration constitutes a material breach.⁷²  Finally, it is the intent of the Legislature to affirm three state court decisions regarding a company’s failure to pay arbitration fees that constitute a breach of the arbitration agreement.⁷³ 

Section Two of the bill amends Section 1280 of the Code of Civil Procedure by adding three definitions: “consumer”; “drafting party”; and, “employee”.

Consumer is defined to be an individual who uses or purchases any goods or services for personal or household purposes.⁷⁴  Drafting party is defined to be the company or business that includes in a consumer or employment agreement any arbitration provision.⁷⁵  Employee is defined to be an applicant for employment, as well as a current or former employee, and those who have been misclassified as an independent contractor.⁷⁶

Section Three of the bill amends Section 1281.96 of the Code of Civil Procedure to add specified information to be collected. Under existing law, a private arbitration company that administers or is otherwise involved in a consumer arbitration shall collect, publish at least quarterly, and make available to the public on the Internet website of the company, a single cumulative report that contains specified information regarding each consumer arbitration within the preceding five years.⁷⁷ 

This bill adds a twelfth category of specified information.⁷⁸  As a result, the following information must also be collected by a private arbitration company: Demographic data, reported in the aggregate, relative to ethnicity, race, disability, veteran status, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation of all arbitrators as self-reported by the arbitrators.⁷⁹  Demographic data disclosed or released pursuant to this paragraph shall also indicate the percentage of respondents who declined to respond.⁸⁰ 

Section Four of the bill adds Section 1281.97 to the Code of Civil Procedure. In either employment or consumer arbitrations that require the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed, the drafting party is deemed to be in material breach of the agreement, is in default and thereby waives its right to compel arbitration if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration are not paid within 30 days after their due date.⁸¹ 

If the drafting party materially breaches the agreement and is in default, then the consumer or employee can either withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed to civil court⁸², or can compel arbitration in which the drafting party must pay all fees and costs.⁸³  If the consumer or employee proceeds with a court action, then the statute of limitations is tolled as of the first filing of a claim.⁸⁴  And, if such a civil court action proceeds, then the court must impose sanctions on the drafting party.⁸⁵ 

Section Five of the bill adds Section 1281.98 to the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar to the prior new section of law, in either employment or consumer arbitrations that require the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding, the drafting party is deemed to be in material breach of the agreement, is in default and thereby waives its right to compel arbitration if the fees or costs to continue an arbitration are not paid within 30 days after their due date.⁸⁶ 

If the drafting party materially breaches the agreement and is in default, then the consumer or employee “may unilaterally elect” to either withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed to civil court⁸⁷, or continue the arbitration if the arbitration company agrees to continue the procedure.⁸⁸  The arbitration company may institute a collection action at the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding against the drafting party.⁸⁹

Or the employee or consumer may petition the court for an order compelling the drafting party to pay all arbitration fees it is obligated to pay.⁹⁰  Or the consumer or employee can pay the drafting party’s fees and be awarded in recovery the fees that were paid on the drafting party’s behalf.⁹¹ 

If the consumer or employee proceeds with a court action, then the statute of limitations is tolled as of the first filing of a claim.⁹²  And, if such a civil court action proceeds, the employee or consumer may bring a motion or action to recover all attorney’s fees and costs for the abandoned arbitration proceeding.⁹³  Thereafter, the court must impose sanctions on the drafting party.⁹⁴  In addition, if the employee or consumer continues the arbitration, then the arbitrator must impose monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating sanctions against the drafting party.⁹⁵

Section Six of the bill adds Section 1281.99 to the Code of Civil Procedure. This section requires a court to impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party that materially breaches an arbitration agreement.⁹⁶  If the court imposes such a sanction, the drafting party must be ordered to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.⁹⁷

In addition to the monetary sanction, a court may order additional sanctions against a drafting party, unless the court finds that the party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction “unjust.”⁹⁸  The additional sanction can include an evidence sanction⁹⁹ or a terminating sanction¹⁰⁰.

Vetoed Bills

Because several heavily-lobbied bills made it to the Governor’s Desk, but were ultimately vetoed, it is helpful to review what the bills proposed to do and what the Governor’s veto message stated. The following were key labor and employment bills that passed the Legislature, but were vetoed by Governor Newsom:

AB 171 (Gonzalez)

This bill would have prohibited an employer from discharging or in any manner discriminating or retaliating against an employee because of the employee’s status as a victim of sexual harassment.

Governor Newsom’s veto message read, in part:

This bill amends the Labor Code to extend anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination protections to survivors of sexual harassment. These protections are currently provided to survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking. The bill also establishes a rebuttable presumption of unlawful retaliation, if an employer takes adverse action against the employee within 90 days, as specified.

I strongly support the Legislature’s efforts to strengthen workplace protections for all survivors of harassment and abuse. However, this bill creates a standard for a particular form of sex-based discrimination different from applicable standards for other forms of discrimination that could weaken, rather than strengthen, existing worker protections. Incorporating sexual harassment into the Labor Code duplicates, and in some crucial respects, weakens existing law under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which already includes protections and remedies for survivors of sexual harassment when employers act unlawfully. AB 171 would also result in potentially overlapping claims filed with both the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) as well as the Labor Commissioner, which could create confusion and potentially limit workers’ rights.

I encourage the Legislature to work collaboratively with DFEH to evaluate if and how the FEHA can be enhanced to better protect survivors of sexual harassment against unlawful employment practices.

AB 403 (Kalra) 

This bill, for a violation subject to a 6-month deadline for filing, would have extended the period to file a complaint to within 2 years after the occurrence of the violation. This bill would have also authorized a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who brings a successful action for a violation of these provisions.

Governor Newsom’s veto message read, in part:

This bill would extend the period to file a whistleblower retaliation complaint with the Labor Commissioner from six months to within two years after the retaliation has occurred. This bill would also authorize a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who brings a successful anti-retaliation action.

I commend the Legislature’s recent work to enact strong anti-retaliation measures, including providing the Labor Commissioner’s Office with authority to investigate retaliation when workers are too fearful to file a formal complaint, as well as the power to issue an administrative citation to enforce anti-retaliation statutes.

The Legislature has recognized that swift enforcement action by the Labor Commissioner is one of the most effective tools to combat retaliation and mitigate against its chilling effect on the rights of workers. I urge the Legislature to consider an approach that is consistent with other anti-retaliation statute of limitations in the Labor Code which are set at one year.

AB 589 (Gonzalez)

This bill would have made it unlawful for an employer to knowingly destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document of another person in the course of committing, or with the intent to commit, trafficking, peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or a coercive labor practice.

Governor Newsom’s veto message read, in part:

This bill makes it unlawful for an employer to knowingly destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess any passport, immigration document or government identification in the course of committing human trafficking or a coercive labor practice. Employers who violate this provision are subject to criminal and civil penalties.

This bill also requires all employers to provide a “Worker’s Bill of Rights” to every employee.
Human trafficking is a problem of international proportions, and California must continue to act forcefully to protect workers against these heinous crimes. The provision in this bill that levies a hefty civil penalty on employers who engage in document abuse in order to commit tracking is a step in the right direction.

Nonetheless, I take issue with the bill’s requirement that every employer in the state provide each employee with an enumerated list of rights. Workers should be informed of their rights, including protections against document abuse and tracking. But the proposed notice requirement is not the answer. It is overly burdensome for law-abiding employers and may not actually help workers who are the targets of trafficking.

AB 1478 (Carrillo)

This bill, as an alternative to filing a complaint with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, would have authorized an employee aggrieved under the provisions prohibiting specified types of discrimination described above to bring a private civil action against the employee’s employer and would not have required that employee to pursue any other remedy prior to bringing that action.

Governor Newsom’s veto message read, in part

Under current law, employers are prohibited from retaliating against survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking when they seek time off work to obtain relief that helps ensure the health and safety of survivors or their children. AB 1478 expressly states that employees may file a private lawsuit when such anti-retaliation provisions are violated by an employer, and they may recover attorney’s fees in addition to reinstatement and damages.

Survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking already have the ability under current law to file a retaliation claim through the Labor Commissioner’s Office, file a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim, and to seek reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and benefits.

I look forward to continuing to work with the Legislature to ensure the state vigorously enforces laws that protect workers and survivors of abuse.

SB 218 (Bradford)

This bill, among other things, would have revised the state preemption and authorized the legislative body of a local government, located within the County of Los Angeles, to enact a local antidiscrimination ordinance relating to employment, including establishing remedies and penalties for violations. The bill would have authorized a local government to create a local agency to enforce local antidiscrimination laws.

Governor Newsom’s veto message read, in part

This bill would amend the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) to permit local jurisdictions in Los Angeles County to enact and enforce their own laws prohibiting employment discrimination as long as they are at a minimum as protective as the FEHA.

I am committed to combating and eradicating discrimination and have signed several measures this year to address discriminatory practices. However, I don’t support lifting a preemption that has been in place for decades in the manner proposed in this bill. As crafted, this measure could create confusion, inconsistent enforcement of the law and increase costs without a corresponding increase in worker protection.

This bill leaves ambiguities about local governments’ ability to enforce both local ordinances and FEHA. I invite the Legislature to come back with a measure that makes it clear that local enforcement measures are exclusively focused on local ordinances.

1. See Government Code Section 12960(b), which provides: “For purposes of this section, filing a complaint means filing an intake form with the department and the operative date of the verified complaint relates back to the filing of the intake form.”

2. Sections 51, 51.5, 51.7, 54, 54.1, or 54.2 of the Civil Code.

3. Government Code Section 12960(e).

4. Commencing with Section 12940.

5. Government Code Section 12960(e).

6. Section 3 provides: “This act shall not be interpreted to revive lapsed claims.”

7. “(a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of this state to ensure that all persons have the full benefit of the rights, forums, and procedures established in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code) and the Labor Code.
   (b) It is the purpose of this act to ensure that individuals are not retaliated against for refusing to consent to the waiver of those rights and procedures and to ensure that any contract relating to those rights and procedures be entered into as a matter of voluntary consent, not coercion.”

8. Section 12953 is added to the Government Code.

9. See Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.

10. Section 432.6 is added to the Labor Code.

11. Labor Code Section 432.6(a).

12. Id.

13. Labor Code Section 432.6(b).

14. Labor Code Section 432.6(c).

15. Labor Code Section 432.6(d).

16. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78c.

17. Labor Code Section 432.6(e).

18. Labor Code Section 432.6(f).

19. Labor Code Section 432.6(g).

20. Labor Code Section 432.6(h).

21. Labor Code Section 432.6(i).

22. Labor Code Section 210(a).

23. Id.

24. Pursuant to Labor Code Section 98.

25. Labor Code Section 210(b).

26. See Labor Code Sections 1197.1(b) – (k).

27. Id.

28. As set forth in Labor Code Section 2699(a).

29. Labor Code Section 210(c).

30. Labor Code Section 1031(a).

31. Id.

32. Id.

33. Labor Code Section 1031(b).

34. Id.

35. Labor Code Section 1031(c).

36. Labor Code Section 1031(c)(1).

37. Labor Code Section 1031(c)(2).

38. Labor Code Section 1031(c)(3).

39. Labor Code Section 1031(c)(4).

40. Labor Code Section 1031(d).

41. Id.

42. Labor Code Section 1031(e).

43. Labor Code Section 1031(f)(1).

44. Labor Code Section 1031(f)(2).

45. Labor Code Section 1031(h).

46. Id.

47. Labor Code Section 1031(j).

48. Id.

49. Labor Code Section 1033(a). This is the rest period and meal break section of the Labor Code.

50. Pursuant to Section 98.7 of the Labor Code.

51. Id.

52. Labor Code Section 1033(c).

53. Id.

54. Labor Code Section 1034(a).

55. See Labor Code Section 1034(a)(1) – (4).

56. Labor Code Section 1034(b).

57. Labor Code Section 1034(c).

58. Labor Code Section 1034(d).

59. CCP Section 1002.5(a).

60. CCP Section 1002.5(b)(1)(A).

61. CCP Section 1002.5(b)(1)(B).

62. CCP Section 1002.5(b)(2).

63. CCP Section 1002.5(a).

64. See CCP Section 1002.5(c).

65. CCP Section 1002.5(c)(1).

66. CCP Section 1002.5(c)(2).

67. CCP Section 1002.5(c)(3).

68. Section 1, subdivision (a).

69. Section 1, subdivision (b).

70. Section 1, subdivision (c).

71. Section 1, subdivision (d).

72. Section 1, subdivision (e).

73. Section 1, subdivision (f).

74. New subdivision (c) reads as follows: “Consumer” means an individual who seeks, uses, or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.

75. New subdivision (e) reads as follows: “Drafting party” means the company or business that included a predispute arbitration provision in a contract with a consumer or employee. The term includes any third party relying upon, or otherwise subject to the arbitration provision, other than the employee or consumer.

76. New subdivision (f) reads as follows: “Employee” means any current employee, former employee, or applicant for employment. The term includes any person who is, was, or who claims to have been misclassified as an independent contractor or otherwise improperly placed into a category other than employee or applicant for employment.

77. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.96(a).

78. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.96(a)(12).

79. Id.

80. Id.

81. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97(a).

82. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97(b)(1).

83. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97(b)(2).

84. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97(c).

85. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97(d).

86. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(a).

87. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(b)(1).

88. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(b)(2).

89. Id.

90. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(b)(3).

91. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(b)(4).

92. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(b)(1).

93. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(c)(1).

94. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(c)(2).

95. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.98(d).

96. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.99(a).

97. Id.

98. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.99(b).

99. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.99(b)(1). The evidence sanction would prohibit the drafting party from conducting in the civil action.

100. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.99(b)(2). The terminating sanction would result in an order striking the pleadings, rendering judgment by default, or a contempt sanction.