In Adams v. All Coast, LLC, the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that crewmembers working aboard liftboats servicing offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico were not exempt from the overtime wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).^[1] Under the FLSA, “any employee employed as a seaman” is exempt from the overtime provisions, which require an employer to pay time and a half to any employee who works “longer than forty hours” in a week.^[2] Finding that the crewmembers were “seamen” in name only, the Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the employer owed these certain maritime workers unpaid overtime. This decision could impact which maritime workers are considered exempt from the FLSA, and more importantly, which workers are not.

In Adams, various crewmembers who worked aboard liftboats for the defendant filed a collective action asserting that because they spent a majority of their time performing “terrestrial” tasks — i.e., operating a crane to move equipment — they were not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Essentially, the crewmembers contended that their job titles (deckhand, mate, ordinary seaman) hid their true task: crane operator on a jacked-up, stationary liftboat. The crewmembers’ employer had not paid overtime to the plaintiffs because it classified them as seamen, who are exempt from those provisions.^[3] At the district court level, the court found in favor of the employer and granted summary judgment finding that because the employees’ work served the liftboats’ operation “as a means of transportation,” they could be considered seamen under the FLSA. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, and then reversed and remanded.

In analyzing whether the crewmembers should be considered exempt from the FLSA’s provisions, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating that the employer bears the burden of establishing that an FLSA exemption applies. Bearing this burden, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the crewmembers should be classified as “seamen.” Next, the Fifth Circuit noted that although the FLSA does not define “seaman,” the courts have fashioned a definition based on the Department of Labor’s regulations. In reviewing these regulations, the Fifth Circuit explained that an employee is a seaman, under the FLSA, if “(1) the employee is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master; and (2) the employee’s service is primarily offered to aid the vessel as a means of transportation, provided that the employee does not perform a substantial amount of different work.”^[4]

In the instant case, the parties did not dispute that the crewmembers met the first prong — there was no doubt that the employees all ate, slept, and worked aboard the liftboats and were subject to a captain’s authority. Rather, the dispute centered around whether the crewmembers’ work aided the liftboat’s operation “as a means of transportation.” The district court had concluded that the amount of time the crewmembers spent operating the crane was irrelevant because crane operation was seaman’s work that aided the vessel as a means of transportation. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit definitively held that such a conclusion contradicted the clear language of the Department of Labor’s regulations.

Citing several regulations,^[5] the Fifth Circuit explained that when a crewmember simply assists with loading or unloading of cargo or with “essentially industrial” tasks, that portion of their work does not qualify as “seaman’s work.” Accordingly, when reading these regulations in tandem, the Fifth Circuit explained that the crewmembers aboard the liftboats performed both seaman’s work and non-seaman’s work. For example, when the crewmembers were performing their nautical duties, such as cleaning, attending safety meetings, and performing regular inspections, they were engaged in seaman’s work. On the other hand, when the crewmembers were operating the cranes, that was not considered to be engaging in “seaman’s work.” Further evidencing the division of work, the Fifth Circuit noted that once the crewmembers finished their duties as the crew, the crewmembers turned their attention exclusively to operating the cranes. Considering this dichotomy of tasks, the Fifth Circuit remarked, “[i]t was as though they were performing two discrete jobs: upkeep of the boat and operation of the crane.”

In short, the Fifth Circuit found that analyzing the amount of time the plaintiffs spent operating the cranes was crucial to whether they should be considered to be doing seaman’s work and, thus, to be exempt from the FLSA. Considering the foregoing and because the record showed that the crewmembers spent between 25% and 90% of their time operating the crane, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case has implications for classifying maritime workers. If an employee spends most of his time doing “terrestrial work” or non-seaman’s work, the employee may not be exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA, even if he works aboard a vessel. 

^[1] C.A. No. 19-30907, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4003 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2021).

^[2] See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

^[3] See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.

^[4] Adams, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4003, at *6 (quoting Coffin v. Blessey Marine Servs., Inc., 771 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 783.31)).

^[5] See 29 C.F.R. § 783.32; 29 C.F.R. § 783.34.