It’s rather fitting that the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores turns on the idea of one’s belief; it is, after all, a decision about religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The belief at issue, however, is not the belief of the claimant of religious discrimination, but rather the belief of the employer.

In Abercrombie, an applicant for a position with an Abercrombie & Fitch store wore a hijab, a headscarf worn out of devotion to the Muslim faith, throughout her interview with the store’s assistant manager. Although the assistant manager determined that she was qualified for the position, the headscarf would be a violation of the store’s “Look Policy,” which prohibits head coverings of any kind. The assistant manager then sought the advice of the district manager, telling him that she believed the applicant wore the headscarf because of her religion. The district manager then suggested that any headwear, religious or not, would be a violation of the store’s policy and then directed the assistant manager not to hire the applicant. At no time did the applicant give the store employees any actual notice of the reason she wore the hijab, nor did she request any accommodation from the store policy to wear one if she were hired.

The crucial question of the case, then, was whether the potential employer needed actual knowledge of the employee’s religious reasons for the headscarf or if the manager’s belief that the hijab may have been part of a religious practice was enough to implicate Title VII. The Supreme Court agreed with the EEOC that actual knowledge was not required if the potential need for a religious accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s hiring decision. Because the employer was aware that there may be a need for an accommodation, it showed disparate treatment under Title VII to the applicant due to her religion. The court focused on the language of Title VII in 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(m), which states that, “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” There is no knowledge requirement in the text, merely a prohibition on discriminatory motivating factors in employment decisions. It was significant for the court that some antidiscrimination laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act do contain knowledge requirements, while Title VII clearly does not.

The Abercrombie case may be the strongest statement yet from the court on Title VII protections for religious discrimination. The import for employers is tremendous, in that an employer cannot merely claim ignorance of actual knowledge of the applicant or employee’s religion when the employer made an employment decision based on the employer’s belief that the person may need a religious accommodation. Employers should take caution when faced with potential religious accommodation issues, and they should evaluate potential trouble spots where otherwise neutral policies such as the appearance policy at issue in this case might conflict with the religious practices of applicants or employees. Simply put, a belief about another’s belief may be enough to rise to a claim of discrimination.