In recent years, numerous state courts across the country have been asked to consider the question whether a plaintiff’s claim can be retroactively revived by the legislature after the claim has been extinguished by a statute of limitations. The Law Court, in Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, has now addressed that question in a lengthy and thorough opinion. The Court—building on its long history of vested rights decisions as well as its groundbreaking 2022 decision on that topic—emphatically answered the question “no.”

More than two decades ago, Maine’s Legislature prospectively eliminated the statutes of limitations for sexual abuse. More recently, however, the Legislature sought to revive claims that had previously been barred by the statute of limitations. The validity of this later action was at issue in Dupuis.

The majority opinion, authored by Justice Connors, primarily relied on two centuries of Maine precedent stating the principle that an amendment to a statute of limitations cannot retroactively revive cases in which the statute of limitations has expired without violating a party’s vested rights. As the Court wrote,

[W]e have declared flatly, many times, with no articulated restriction, in varied types of cases, both common law and statutorily created, that a claim cannot be revived after its statute of limitations has expired.

Most interestingly, however, the Court went on examine Maine’s “longstanding antipathy toward retroactive legislation of this type, first pronounced at the founding of our state.” The Court’s examination occurred in the context of its application of the primacy doctrine, pursuant to which it interprets the Maine Constitution independently (without being bound by federal precedent).

In interpreting the Constitution, the Court relied most heavily on two factors:

• The Constitution’s text. The Court emphasized the importance of a “holistic review” of the Constitution’s provisions. In conducting this review, the Court noted first the Constitution’s provisions protecting property, privileges, and natural rights—each of which substantively protect rights that have vested under the law, and each of which requires “general, equal, and fixed application of the law.” The Court also noted that the Constitution limits the scope of legislative power to adoption of general and prospective rules. Based on these principles, the Law Court observed that, “as early as our founding and many times thereafter, [it has] interpreted our constitutional text to reject retrospective legislation impairing vested rights.”
• Contemporaneous common law principles. The Court also placed significant weight on the fact that, at the time of the drafting of the Maine Constitution, “the common law condemned the concept of retroactive liability.” In light of this history, and the subsequent two hundred years of practice, the Legislature’s action in seeking to revive expired claims was “aberrant”—indeed, unprecedented in Maine.

The Court’s primacy analysis of the Constitution’s text and history—notable for its thoroughness—led the majority to conclude:

[O]ur case law prohibiting the revival of claims after the expiration of their statute of limitations flows inexorably from the anti-retroactivity theme permeating our constitutional text, which in turn was forged from longstanding principles of common law.

The Court, however, did not stop there; it also examined precedent from federal and other state courts. It concluded that its holding was supported by a majority of state courts and rejected the contrary rule as unworkable and unrealistic. The Court discarded the primary argument in support of the Legislature’s action, namely, that retroactive reinstatement of expired claims does not deprive a person of vested rights but merely affects legal remedies, as an artificial distinction. Notably, the Court also concluded that subjecting vested rights to an ad hoc balancing approach (as under federal law) would contradict Maine precedent and would “strip[] long protected rights of meaningful protection.” As the Court wrote,

[C]onsistent with the understanding of the founders, we have always adhered to and affirmed as recently as 2022 the protection of vested rights under our Constitution; these rights are not subject to destruction, however compelling the reason for destroying the right. A balancing test is not only contrary to our precedent but unsupported by our constitutional text and the common law, and is amorphous, inconsistent, unworkable, and could potentially trample constitutionally protected rights based on transient majority inclination or the view of an individual judge.

Thus, as the Court held, “[o]nce a statute of limitations has expired for a claim, a right to be free of that claim has vested, and the claim cannot be revived.”

The Court’s opinion is notable enough for its holding, but is notable for numerous other reasons as well. It provides to practitioners the most important recent guidance regarding how the Law Court thinks about serious constitutional questions. It highlights the importance of careful (and holistic) textual analysis informed by historical understandings, contemporaneous common law principles, and post-enactment legal developments that illuminate the Constitution’s meaning. It also affirms the Law Court’s emphasis on the value and importance of its own prior precedent, as compared to federal precedent. And, finally, it highlights the Court’s willingness to reach an independent conclusion based on this distinctively Maine text, history, and jurisprudence.