Hi TCPAWorld! The Baroness here. It feels like it has been some time since I last blogged, but I am here to brief you on a new interesting case.

At a high level, this case is about whether the Plaintiff William Weber clearly revoked his consent to be contacted by Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC.

A bit of background, Weber entered into cash-out refinancing agreements with lender, Recovco, in order to purchase investment properties. Weber listed his phone number on each loan application. Shortly after entering into the loan agreements, Recovco transferred the loans to Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS). As a result, Weber had to make timely and acceptable monthly payments to SLS.

Weber made payments to SLS for all 10 of his loans through a certified lump-sum check. SLS never notified Weber that this payment method was improper.

On May 16, 2019, Weber contended that SLS rejected his payment and notified Weber via telephone that he failed to make payments for any of his accounts in May and that his payments were past due. Between May and July 2019, SLS called Weber several times and left prerecorded voice messages.

Based on the above, Weber and his named real estate investment company plaintiffs 212 East Oak St., LLC, Eragon, LLC, The Red Baron Properties, LLC, and The Real Estate Investment Company, LLC sued Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC alleging violations of, amongst others, the TCPA.

SLS moved for summary judgment.

Now the law.

When, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.

Here, Weber contended SLS violated the TCPA by sending prerecorded calls to him without his prior express written consent. On the other hand, SLS contended that Weber did, in fact, provide his prior express written consent to be contacted via telephone. SLS argued that by Weber providing his telephone number to it, he was providing his prior express written consent to be contacted.

But the issue is not one of consent. It is whether Weber effectively revoked his consent.

Weber argued that he revoked his consent at one point.

While SLS conceded that Weber at least partially revoked his consent, SLS argued the revocation of consent was not clear. More specifically, SLS argued Weber did not revoke consent on all ten loans and that due to this partial revocation, there is no evidence concerning which loans Weber revoked consent for and whether SLS contacted Weber about specific loans after consent was revoked.

The North Carolina Court held there were genuine issues of material fact here. And because genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether Weber revoked consent totally or partially and what day Weber totally or partially revoked consent, the Court denied summary judgment to SLS on Weber’s TCPA claim.