The Law Court recently issued a decision in Eastern Maine Conservation Initiative v. Board of Environmental Protection that contains an enlightening discussion of what an agency must consider—as opposed to what an agency may consider—in issuing a permit. In so doing, it adopted an important limit on how far agencies must go in reviewing a project’s downstream impacts.

The case involved an appeal of a permit issued by the Department of Environmental Protection for an aquaculture facility. The permit, upheld by the Board of Environmental Protection, authorized construction of the aquaculture facility under the state Site Location of Development Law (Site Law) and installation of intake and outfall pipes under the Natural Resources Protection Act (NRPA).

Opponents of the project argued that the agency erroneously failed to conduct an independent assessment under NRPA of the harm that the project would cause to wildlife habitats. NRPA specifies that certain enumerated activities require a permit, including construction and dredging. These proposed activities must then meet various standards, including that the activity will not “unreasonably harm” wildlife habitat. Petitioners did not challenge the agency’s assessment of the impacts of construction and dredging; instead, they argued that the agency should have analyzed the effects of effluent discharge—an activity that is not enumerated in NRPA—on wildlife habitat.

The Law Court rejected this argument based on the plain language of NRPA. The Court concluded that only enumerated “activities” trigger agency review in an application for a permit under NRPA. Because the discharge of treated wastewater is not an enumerated activity, the Court held that the agency did not err by declining to analyze the issue in approving the permit.

Most interestingly, the Law Court went on to distinguish one of the cases relied upon by the petitioners, Hannum v. Board of Environmental Protection. In that case, the Law Court had upheld a denial of a NRPA permit for installation of a pier and floating dock. The agency had concluded that the use of the dock—not just its construction—would disturb tern and seal colonies. The Court affirmed because it concluded that the Board has the power to deny a permit based on its proposed use. In Eastern Maine Conservation Initiative, the Court distinguished the case as follows:

To be clear, in Hannum we did not say that the agency is obligated under NRPA to consider the expected effects on wildlife of the intended use of a structure or facility. Rather, Hannum held that it was within the agency’s discretion to take those impacts into consideration in evaluating compliance with the standard in [NRPA].

In the Court’s view, then, Hannum establishes that (at least in certain circumstances) DEP may consider activities other than those enumerated in NRPA. As an aside, it may be reasonable to question the holding in Hannum—after all, if NRPA specifically identifies the relevant activities whose impacts must be considered, the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory interpretation would seem to suggest that the agency may not go any further. Regardless, Eastern Maine Conservation Initiative makes clear that Hannum only goes so far—simply because it may consider certain unenumerated activities, the agency at the very least does not have to consider unenumerated activities that may follow from NRPA-regulated conduct (and which had separately been reviewed under a different statutory scheme). This is an important limitation on the required scope of agency review for environmental permits.