The Appeals Court of Massachusetts recently took up another summary process action concerning landlord-tenant rights and Chapter 93A violations in Hayastan Indus., Inc. v. Guz. In a summary decision[1], the court affirmed a liability finding against a landlord for Chapter 93A violations under several distinct theories. 

Plaintiff, a corporate entity, purchased a manufactured home and the lot it resided on from the bank after defendants defaulted on their loan. Plaintiff then brought a summary process action in the Housing Court to take possession of the manufactured home, and the tenants counter-claimed for Chapter 93A violations. The Housing Court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim for possession of the manufactured home and found plaintiff violated Chapter 93A. 

 The Appeals Court agreed that the Housing Court erred in concluding that the 30-day notice to quit delivered to the tenants without cause violated the M.G.L. c. 140, § 32J requirement, which is designed to protect owners of manufactured homes. At the time of the notice to quit, the tenants no longer owned the manufactured home and were no longer entitled to the statute’s protections. Thus, the Housing Court erred in dismissing the possession claim based on a M.G.L. c. 140, § 32J violation and in finding a Chapter 93A violation based on this statutory violation. 

The Appeals Court further determined, however, that the Housing Court did not err when it concluded that an April 27, 2020, letter plaintiff sent to the tenants violated the Massachusetts eviction moratorium during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the letter did violate the eviction moratorium, the Appeals Court disagreed with the Housing Court that this technical violation was a “serious interference” with a tenancy such that it violated Massachusetts’ quiet enjoyment statute. The Housing Court therefore vacated that ruling and the damages awarded on this claim. This issue was remanded to the Housing Court for the limited purpose of determining whether the technical violation of the eviction moratorium caused the tenants a loss as required to recover under G.L. c. 93A. 

Finally, the Appeals Court did not believe the judge erred in finding a violation of Chapter 93A due to plaintiff’s inclusion of lot fees in the summary process complaint, when such fees had previously been adjudicated by the Housing Court not to be owed by the tenants. The Housing Court found that plaintiff “commenced eviction proceedings approximately nine days after purchasing the home because it intended to make repairs and put it on the market for sale,” which supported the conclusion that the notice to quit was motivated by business reasons. These “business reasons” amounted to conduct in trade or commerce for the purposes of Chapter 93A. The Housing Court found, and the Appeals Court agreed, that even though the summary process complaint was amended to remove the demand for lot fees, the elements of c. 93A were still met at the time the summary process complaint was served. Thus, the demand for invalidated lot fees amounted to an unfair or deceptive business practice, which caused defendant to suffer an emotional injury in the form of lost sleep and anxiety. The Appeals Court noted that the failure of the company to apprise itself of the legal effect of the pending appeal did not amount to the sort of negligence that precludes liability under G.L. c. 93A.

The Appeals Court decision on the final issue seems to run contrary to established law that petitioning activity is typically immune from Chapter 93A liability.[2] It does not appear that plaintiff’s petitioning activity was frivolous or designed to frustrate competition.[3] Rather, plaintiff sought to take possession of a property it recently purchased through a summary process complaint and amended the complaint to remove the demand for lot fees it was not owed prior to actual litigation on the issue. This case highlights what appears to be a trend at the trial court level to expand the scope of Chapter 93A liability.

[1] A summary decision is a decision primarily directed to the parties and represent only the views of the panel that decide the case. It may be cited for its persuasive value but is not binding precedent. 

[2] See Morrison v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 441 Mass. 451, 457 (2004) (Chapter 93A “has never been read so broadly as to establish an independent remedy for unfair or deceptive dealings in the context of litigation, with the statutory exception as to those ‘engaged in the business of insurance’”).

[3] See Bristol Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Rochester Bituminous Products, Inc., 493 Mass. 539 (2024).