Last June, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, which holds that the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks to impose civil monetary penalties (CMPs) for a securities fraud violation. While the Jarkesy decision focused on the SEC’s administrative process, enforcement actions involving CMPs brought by other federal agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), also proceed through an agency tribunal as opposed to a jury trial. In particular, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which is part of HHS, has the authority to issue CMPs in countless circumstances.

As of the date of this article, we are not aware of any federal court case that specifically challenges HHS’s administrative CMP process, but parties are starting to assert Jarkesy-based arguments in appealing HHS administrative actions. For example, in November, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) issued a decision on an appeal filed by a skilled nursing facility (SNF) that raised Jarkesy-based arguments. The SNF had challenged an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision to grant summary judgment in favor of CMS in a case where CMS imposed a CMP of $1,103 per day for 109 days of noncompliance with certain Medicare participation requirements. In pertinent part, the SNF moved for the DAB to remand and refund its CMP. The SNF argued that, based on Jarkesy, the ALJ proceeding to review the imposition of CMPs was “void ab initio,” that the ALJ did not have the constitutional authority to conduct its review, and that the CMP appeal should have been heard before a jury.

Ultimately, the DAB vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the DAB’s decision. Notably, however, the DAB rejected the SNF’s Jarkesy arguments because (i) the SNF’s case concerns “an entirely separate statutory authority and regulatory scheme…as administered by [HHS],” (ii) Jarkesy does not apply to the Medicare administrative appeal regime, and (iii) the Supreme Court did not hold that every agency’s attempt to impose and support CMPs necessarily is a suit at common law that must be adjudicated by an Article III court (a point that was key to the Supreme Court’s decision). The DAB also emphasized that it is not the DAB’s role to invalidate any part of the Social Security Act or its implementing regulations. This point was consistent with the DAB’s longstanding approach that ALJs may not declare a statute or regulation to be unconstitutional or refuse to apply or follow a statute or regulation on that basis.

Surely, this proceeding will not be the last time the agency encounters a Jarkesy-based argument. It is only a matter of time before the question of whether and how Jarkesy applies to HHS’s CMP authorities finds its way before the courts. If such a challenge were to succeed, it could upend the agency’s enforcement process as we know it and lead to seismic shifts in the types of enforcement matters HHS prioritizes and pursues. For now, we imagine that HHS (and other agencies) are likely reviewing their CMP procedures and reliance on ALJs to oversee these proceedings for Jarkesy-related vulnerabilities.