In In re Estate of Wright, decedent’s son appealed an order finding that his mother died intestate. No. 13-23-00043-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8078 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi November 21, 2024, no pet. history). The son alleged that on May 7, 2007, the mother executed a holographic will (2007 will) which had not been revoked. His brother filed an amended counter-application for probate of will in which he alleged that on July 20, 1993, the mother executed a will (1993 will) which had not been revoked. In his counter-application, the brother argued that the 2007 will was not valid because:

(1) [did] not purport to revoke the [1993 will] or any prior [w]ills, and could only be construed as a Codicil to the Will submitted herewith, (2) appear[ed] to be written on more than one occasion; (3) contain[ed] two separate dates[;] (4) contain[ed] a curving line over portions of its terms, which line is undated and unsigned; [](5) require[d] clarification as to the terms of the handwritten document itself, and more specifically the terms of the trust mentioned therein including the identity of its corpus, beneficiaries, and trustee(s); (6) was revoked by [Doris] in whole or in part because it indicates that it is “not right” [and] indicates the Decedent “will write new one[.]”

Id. The court held that the 2007 will was effective to revoke the 1993 will, but that the 2007 will was also revoked. So, the trial court held that the decedent died intestate.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order, holding that the 2007 will had not been revoked:

As mentioned above, the trial court’s order concluded that “[Doris’s] May 1, 2007 Holographic Will was revoked by the January 16, 2014[] notations made and signed by [Doris] after her signature of the May 1, 2007 Holographic Will.” The order further concluded that Doris died intestate. In this case, the central dispute between the parties is whether Doris revoked the 2007 will with the language “Not right” and “Will write new one.”

Demry argues, among other things, that the language at issue is “patently not revocatory in nature” and “do[es] not rise to language upon which revocatory intent can be legitimately appended.” Neither of the parties have provided any case authorities holding the language at issue, or similar language, constitutes revocatory intent, and we have found none. Both parties cite to Dean v. Garcia, which concluded that the words “CANCILED [sic]” and “VOID” were “words of cancellation” sufficient to revoke a codicil. 795 S.W.2d 763, 764-66 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied). Thomas argues that Dean is “illustrative of how few words are necessary to revoke a testamentary instrument.” However, Demry argues that the language at issue “does not come remotely close to the language in Dean” and does not consitute “present and clear revocative language.” We agree that the language “Not right” and “Will write new one” are not clear “words of cancellation” sufficient to revoke the 2007 will.

Demry further argues that the language “Will write new one” refers to “an intent to undertake an act in the future . . . and therefore do[es] not comply with the legal requirement that revocatory language must constitute a present intent to revoke.” “A present intent to change or revoke a testamentary instrument in the future cannot accomplish revocation of the instrument, nor is it evidence of the revocation.” Here, the language “Will write new one” cannot be reasonably interpreted to constitute a present intent to revoke the 2007 will. A liberal reading of the language, at most, suggests an intent to create a new will in the future, not an intent to revoke the current will wherein this language appears; therefore, we conclude that the “Will write new one” language did not accomplish the 2007 will’s revocation nor is it evidence of its revocation.

Thomas argues that the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence to determine that Doris intended to revoke the 2007 will through the use of the disputed language. In order for consideration of extrinsic evidence to be proper, the trial court must have first found that the disputed language was ambiguous… As explained above, the disputed language does not constitute clear “words of cancellation” or contain a present intent to revoke the will; thus, we find no patent ambiguity. Similarly, we find no latent ambiguity because the words do not sensibly convey a present intent to revoke the will. Therefore, the trial court erred to the extent it found the disputed language ambiguous as a matter of law and when it considered extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of the disputed language. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that the disputed language revoked the 2007 will.

Id.