In Richey v. Brouse, the settlor created a special needs trust for her son, who had a mental disability and a seizure disorder that required day-to-day care. No. 03-23-00544-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8842 (Tex. App.—Austin December 20, 2024, no pet.). When the settlor died, Richey took over as trustee, and the trust agreement named Brouse as first successor trustee should Richey be “unable or unwilling” to serve as trustee. Brouse became aware that Richey was using trust funds for payment to Richey’s divorce attorney, donations to a YouTube preacher, travel expenses, rent, and a personal vehicle for herself. In addition, Brouse alleged that Richey removed Kirk from his longtime home in St. Louis, Missouri, and moved him to New Mexico, where Richey did not live permanently but visited frequently. Brouse filed suit against Richey, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and sought removal, damages, and attorney’s fees. Brouse moved for partial summary judgment on his breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim and sought removal of Richey as trustee under Section 113.082(a) of the Property Code. Richey was proceeding pro se and she did not file a response. The probate court entered an order granting Brouse’s motion for partial summary judgment, removing Richey as trustee based on her breaches of fiduciary duty. Richey appealed.

The court of appeals first held that Brouse had standing to file suit:

Richey argues that Brouse lacked standing to sue her and seek her removal as trustee. We disagree. Although Richey frames this issue in terms of standing, we note that the proper focus is whether Brouse fell within the category of people authorized to sue. See Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516, 527-29 (Tex. 2022) (distinguishing between “standing” as used in “proper, jurisdictional sense” and “standing” as applied to statutory-interpretation question of whether certain individuals fall within group of people authorized to sue). Brouse’s original petition sought removal of Richey as trustee based on Richey’s alleged breaches of her fiduciary duty. The Trust agreement, which Brouse attached to his petition, provided that Brouse was to serve as the first successor trustee in the event Richey was “unable or unwilling” to serve. Thus, Brouse has two independent bases to bring suit against Richey: first, he has standing as a contingent beneficiary named in the Trust agreement, and second, as an interested person under Subsection 113.082(a) of the Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 113.082(a) (“A trustee may be removed . . . on the petition of an interested person”), 115.011(a) (providing that interested person may bring action against trustee), 111.004(7) (defining “interested person” as “a trustee, beneficiary, or any other person having an interest in or a claim against the trust or any person who is affected by the administration of the trust”).

Id. The court then held that Richey waived her appeal of the summary judgment order by failing to challenge the evidence supporting the ruling. The court affirmed the orders.