In In re Kelly, a former executor and the trustee of a testamentary trust initiated a probate proceeding in a county court at law. No. 11-24-00066-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3735 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 30, 2024, original proc.). An opposing party filed claims against him in the probate proceeding and also filed a suit in district court to remove him as trustee. The former executor filed a motion to abate in the district court, alleging that the county court at law had dominate jurisdiction over the dispute. After the district court denied the motion to abate, the former executor filed a petition for writ of mandamus.

The court of appeals noted that as a general matter, the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts. “As a result, when two suits are inherently interrelated, ‘a plea in abatement in the second action must be granted.'” Id. The court stated that it must determine whether the county court at law’s probate jurisdiction extends to the issues raised by in the district court. The court noted that “Texas probate jurisdiction is, to say the least, somewhat complex.” Probate proceedings must be filed and heard in a court that exercises original probate jurisdiction, which was the county court at law in this particular case. When it exercises its original probate jurisdiction, the county court at law has jurisdiction over “all matters relat[ing] to the probate proceeding[s]” as specified in section 31.002 of the Estates Code. The court stated:

Section 31.002(b), in turn, indicates that the jurisdiction of a probate court extends to “the interpretation and administration of a testamentary trust if the will creating the trust has been admitted to probate in the court.” The parties clash over the meaning of “administration” in Section 31.002(b).…

In this case, we are called on to ascertain the meaning of the term “administration,” or the act of administering, which is defined as “to manage the affairs of” or “to direct or superintend the execution, use, or conduct of.” As such, a probate court’s “administration” of a trust under Section 31.002(b) would include any action that directs or superintends the execution, use, or conduct of the testamentary trust. The removal of trustees is one of the ways that Texas courts are called on to “direct” and “conduct” a trust. We also note that Chapter 113 of the Property Code, which contains the requirements for the removal of trustees, is entitled “Administration.” While this title does not inform the otherwise unambiguous meaning of the provisions that follow, it indicates a legislative desire that the “administration” of a trust includes the appointment and removal of trustees. Based on the common and ordinary meaning of the word “administration,” as well as the use of the same term in the Property Code, we conclude that the meaning of “administration” in Section 31.002(b)(2) of the Estates Code unambiguously extends to the removal of trustees. However, even if we were to conclude that Section 31.002(b)(2) does not extend the county court at law’s jurisdiction to the removal of trustees that are created under a testamentary trust, the jurisdiction of the county court at law is not strictly limited to Section 31.002. Rather, when sitting as a probate court, the county court at law may also exercise “pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as necessary to promote judicial efficiency and economy.” … “Typically, probate courts exercise pendant or ancillary jurisdiction when a close relationship exists between the nonprobate claims and the matter pending in the probate court.” That is, probate courts will exercise pendant or ancillary jurisdiction when doing so “will aid in the efficient administration of a matter pending in the probate court.” We conclude that, even if the removal of a trustee were a nonprobate matter for purposes of the county court at law’s jurisdiction under Section 31.002, the county court at law would still have jurisdiction over the removal of Randy as trustee as a result of its pendant and ancillary jurisdiction under Section 32.001. Additionally, Todd’s remaining claims, which involve the alleged mishandling of trust funds, clearly fall within the “administration” of the trust for purposes of Section 31.002(b)(2). Accordingly, the county court at law could properly exercise jurisdiction over all of the claims that Todd has asserted in the district court.

Id. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to abate because the county court at law court has jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of trustees under the testamentary trust and it was the first-filed court and had dominate jurisdiction.