So, your corporation is sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). One defense strategy if you are the founder and sole owner: cease operations, terminate your employees, close your offices, formally dissolve the corporation and live in British Columbia. No potential individual exposure for TCPA violations in Alabama – right?

Not so fast, said the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Eric K. Williams v. John G. Schanck. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151778, Case No.:5-15-cv-01434-MHH, decided September 6, 2019. Mr. Williams originally sued Stellar Recovery, Inc., a company founded and solely owned by Schanck, for collection calls made to the plaintiff’s cellphone in Alabama. Mr. Schanck then told the Court in a telephone conference call that “Stellar Recovery had dissolved and did not intend to participate in this lawsuit.” Mr. Williams moved to amend his complaint to add Mr. Schanck individually and Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala granted his motion.

But, wait a minute, countered Mr. Schanck. Service of the amended complaint on me in Vancouver, British Columbia does not afford the Court personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, Mr. Williams is too late because he added me as a defendant after the four-year TCPA statute of limitations had passed. So, Mr. Schanck moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), respectively.

The Court was unconvinced on both counts.

First, on the jurisdictional issue, the Court examined whether Mr. Schanck’s alleged contacts with the State of Alabama were sufficient to satisfy specific jurisdiction (i.e., “contacts within the forum state give rise to the action before the court”). Mr. Williams asserted that Mr. Schanck “guide[d], over[saw], and ratifie[d] all operations of…Stellar” and knew of the “‘violations of the TCPA alleged’ in the complaint and ‘agreed to and ratified such actions of his company.’” Indeed, throughout the complaint, Mr. Williams contended that “Stellar acted on behalf of Defendant Schanck.”

Mr. Schanck did “not challenge the factual allegations concerning his ownership interest in Stellar or his managerial control over the company.” Rather, he contended that the “corporate shield doctrine” precluded the Court from exercising jurisdiction over him. However, Judge Haikala noted that the “express language of the TCPA allows actions against corporate officers who authorize TCPA violations” and Mr. Williams “has alleged just that – that Mr. Schanck directed and authorized the alleged TCPA violations that purportedly occurred in this District.” Motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2) denied.

Second, the Court also dispensed with the statute of limitations issue. The Court concluded that the claim against Mr. Schanck as an individual arose out of the “conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Under such circumstances, the claims in the amended complaint could relate back to Mr. Williams original complaint.

But, Mr. Schanck argued, Mr. Williams knew about him and his status in Stellar yet chose only to sue the latter. Therefore, there could have been no mistake on his part about the “identity” of the proper party (i.e., Mr. Schanck) to sue and the FRCP 15(c) requirements regarding the timing of serving Mr. Schanck as a new defendant were not met.

Correcting Mr. Schanck’s application of that requirement, the Court noted that the issue was not about Mr. Williams knowledge, but “whether Mr. Schanck himself knew or should have known that he would be named as a defendant ‘but for an error’” by Mr. Williams. And at this stage, “if Mr. Williams contentions about Mr. Schanck’s involvement with Stellar prove correct,” then Mr. Schanck “reasonably should have known that he would be named as a defendant but for an error.” Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) denied.

So some TCPAWorld lessons learned about the solidity of the “corporate” shield when one person allegedly runs the company show.