Jones v. Town of Harwich involved a dispute over the application of the Wetland Protection Bylaw and Regulations in Harwich, Massachusetts (“Wetland Protection Regulations”). In 1958, Lois H. Jones (“Jones”) purchased two distinct lots separated by a private driveway. The lots were known as 5 and 6 Sea Street Extension (“5 Sea Street” and “6 Sea Street”). 5 Sea Street was, and remains, a vacant lot that abuts the ocean. 6 Sea Street is improved with a four-bedroom house. In 1999, Jones sold 6 Sea Street. The record in the case indicated that Jones long intended to construct a single-family dwelling on 5 Sea Street.
In 2011, Jones filed a Notice of Intent with the Harwich Conservation Commission, proposing construction of a single-family residence on 5 Sea Street. In 2012, the Commission issued a denial Order of Conditions. Later that year, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection issued a Superseding Order of Conditions, denying the project under the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act. In 2013, the Town of Harwich changed the tax assessment designation associated with 5 Sea Street to “unbuildable” and reduced the assessed valuation from $1,434,500 to $24,000. In 2015,1 the DEP, Jones, and some abutters, reached a settlement, which included a Final Order of Conditions. Nonetheless, the Harwich Conservation Commission maintained its position that Jones’s proposed construction would violate the Wetlands Protection Regulations, as well as the state wetlands regulations, and denied approval.
Jones filed suit against the Town of Harwich in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the application of the Wetland Protection Regulations to 5 Sea Street constituted a regulatory taking, entitling her to compensation. The Town argued that Jones could only recover if the Wetland Protection Regulations were the “but for” cause of 5 Sea Street being unbuildable. The Town argued that since state wetlands regulations also precluded developing 5 Sea Street, the local Regulations could not be the but for cause of Jones’s harm, and therefore, she could not recover from the Town. The District Court rejected this argument on summary judgment because the record contained evidence that the DEP’s 2015 decision could be amended, and the project might be allowed under state wetland regulations.
Next, the Court applied the cornerstone Penn Central test to determine whether or not the Town’s application of the Wetlands Regulation could constitute a regulatory taking. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The factors applied by the Court include: economic impact of the Regulations on the Plaintiffs; the extent to which the Regulations have interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and the character of the governmental action.
The District Court found that the significant decrease in the property’s value supported a substantial economic impact as a result of the Town’s Regulations. Additionally, the extent to which the Regulations interfered with investment-backed expectations was not appropriate for summary judgment because the parties presented competing arguments and evidence as to Jones’ intention to develop the property, and the alleged “windfall” that her estate would receive from development. Id., at 6. Finally, the District Court held that the character of the governmental action could be equivalent to a typical taking because the Regulations prevent any structure on the lot despite being generally applicable to all property.
Jones is a helpful reminder that application of local regulations may constitute a regulatory taking.
1 Jones passed away in 2014, but her estate continued her efforts to develop 5 Sea Street.