Federal courts can adjudicate state-law claims arising out of the same facts as federal-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but what happens if, after removal, the plaintiff amends her complaint to remove the federal questions supporting jurisdiction? Until recently, the circuit courts that had addressed the issue unanimously concluded that, as a general rule, a post-removal amendment does not automatically divest a federal court of jurisdiction.[1] That changed in July 2023, when the Eighth Circuit created a split by reaching the opposite conclusion.

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted the Eighth Circuit’s view, holding that federal courts lose jurisdiction over state law claims if a plaintiff amends away her federal law claims. Justice Elena Kagan made clear that “[w]hen an amendment excises the federal-law claims that enabled removal, the federal court loses its supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law claims.”

Royal Canin bounced around before ending up before the Supreme Court. It began as a state court antitrust class action brought under the Missouri Antitrust Law, the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, and common law principles of unjust enrichment under Missouri law. The named plaintiff alleged that a consortium of pet food manufacturers, retailers, and veterinary clinics created a system by which prescriptions were needed to purchase certain varieties of dog and cat food. This practice allegedly led consumers to believe that the prescription pet food was healthier and better for their pets than “ordinary” pet food — and they thereby overpaid for the prescription pet food — when, in reality, the prescription pet food was no different than ordinary pet food.

The defendants removed the case to the Western District of Missouri under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal question jurisdiction, and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Although the plaintiff did not explicitly assert any federal claim, the removing defendant argued that the court had federal question jurisdiction because (1) the state law claims explicitly and necessarily turn on an interpretation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA); and (2) the plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the defendants to adhere to federal law.

The district court initially remanded the case to state court because the state law claims did not “necessarily implicate” federal law to support federal question jurisdiction, and because the parties were not minimally diverse to support CAFA jurisdiction. The remand was appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which decided that the case belonged in federal court on federal question grounds. Once back at the district court, the plaintiff amended her complaint to remove references to federal law and the state antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims. The district court later granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the case ended up back before the Eighth Circuit. That court determined that “there [was] nothing federal about” the amended complaint, vacating and remanding the case to the district court with directions to remand it to Missouri state court.

The Supreme Court affirmed and announced a bright-line rule that dismissing federal issues ends federal jurisdiction. The Court recognized that the answer to the questions before it was “certain,” noting that “[w]hen a plaintiff, after removal, cuts out all her federal-law claims, federal-question jurisdiction dissolves.” Consequently, “with any federal anchor gone, supplemental jurisdiction over the residual state claims disappears as well.” A district court considering a complaint devoid of original and supplemental jurisdiction must remand the case to state court. The Court rooted its decision in the text of Section 1367 and its non-removal precedents that found that amending away federal issues removes federal jurisdiction in cases originally filed in federal court.

Royal Canin provides a clean answer to a common issue, though that answer may require some nuance in future cases. Questions remain at the periphery of supplemental jurisdiction. For example, can a district court retain jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing or granting summary judgment on federal law claims? And what happens when a plaintiff’s amendment is less absolute than the amendment in Royal Canin? Crafty plaintiffs may try to avoid federal court while also keeping as many paths to recovery open as they can. The Royal Canin plaintiffs got a clean rule because they made a clean cut of all their federal issues. Will a plaintiff cutting less get the same result? These, and many other, issues remain to be fleshed out.

There is a broader lesson here as well. The circuits were nearly unanimous in rejecting (or at least not adopting) the bright-line rule that the Supreme Court unanimously adopted in Royal Canin. While the Court’s decision is not altogether unexpected or earth shattering, it is a reminder that important matters of procedure are not always as settled as they seem. Just because the circuits have done things a certain way and more or less agreed on it does not mean that the Supreme Court will go along.

Notes

[1] E.g., Ching v. Mitre Corp., 921 F. 2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1990); In Touch Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco P’ship, 788 F.3d 98, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2015); Collura v. Philadelphia, 590 F. App’x 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F. 3d 444, 448 (4th Cir. 2004); Louisiana v. Am. Nat. Prop. Cas. Co., 746 F.3d 633, 636–38 (5th Cir. 2014); Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F. 3d 195, 210–211 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 380 (7th Cir. 2010); Broadway Grill, Inc. v. Visa, Inc., 856 F.3d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017); Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F. 3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002).