That was fast.

It has only been about a week since the Supreme Court destroyed everything we thought we knew about the TCPA, and we already have our first post-McKesson district court ruling on a critical TCPA issue.

Are cell phones “residential” for purposes of DNC protections? 

That is the question the court answered in Wilson v. Hard Eight, 2025 WL 1784815 (D. Or. June 27, 2025.)

Backing up, DNC protections only flow in favor of “residential telephone subscribers.” Way back in 2003, however, the FCC held cellular phones used for residential purposes qualified as “residential telephone” numbers– so cellular phone users could sue for DNC violations.

This rule directly conflicts with the common interpretation of 227(b)’s similar– but slightly different–language regulating calls to a “residential line.” In that context courts routinely hold the section only applies to calls to landlines.

So they key question– did Congressional use of the word “residential” in the two sections imply co-extensive regulation, or was the use of “subscriber” vs “line” in the two sections intended to drive a different regulatory outcome?

Before McKesson it didn’t matter what any individual court thought of this interesting issue– they were bound to follow the FCC’s view of the world and grant protections to cellular phone numbers. But thoe day are gone.

So the Wilson court had to make a determination for itself. But it reached the same conclusion as the FCC.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, it found the distinction between “subscriber” and “line” a key driver in the outcome:

In trying to equate the two sections, Defendant argues that “residential telephone subscribers” in Section 227(c) means “landlines.” Def. Mot. at 3. But, unlike Section 227(b), Section 227(c) does not refer to any kind of transmission technology; it does not refer to “residential telephone line” or “landline” or “line.” And Congress knew how to denote line-transmission technology because it did so in Section 227(b).

Not too surprising, I suppose although an alternate reading is surely possible.

The Court went on to explain that “residential” simply meant “use at home” and not a hardwire in the phone:

So, “residential telephone subscribers,” refers to individuals, subscribers, who make regular payments to use telephone service at home, that is, people who use a telephone for a personal or private purpose—a use traditionally tied to the home—as opposed to a commercial or business use. “According to the TCPA’s plain language and dictionary definitions of ‘residence’ and ‘subscriber,’ ‘a residential subscriber is one who maintains a phone for residential purposes … i.e., for personal activities associated with his or her private, domestic life.’ ”

Eh… maybe.

Yes residential means “having to do with a residence” it is also certainly true that objects not tied to a residence are not residential due to their mobility. A car may park in a garage but no one thinks of a car as “residential.” Just saying.

Ultimately court decided it agreed with the FCC and applied the DNC protections to cell phones in that case.

But there’s the thing– post-McKesson this is just a data point folks. The next court might entirely disagree.

We will have to wait and watch and wonder what comes next.