On Wednesday, June 26, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued a 6–3 decision in Snyder v. United States, overturning the jury conviction of an Indiana mayor under Title 18, Section 666, of the U.S. Code for accepting gratuities. In overturning the conviction, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split between the 1st and 5th Circuits on the one hand, and the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits on the other, over the scope of what activities Section 666 criminalized. In a blow to Section 666, which federal prosecutors often charge to target alleged public corruption, the Supreme Court found the statute intended to criminalize bribes (i.e., a payment in return for being influenced) and not gratuities (i.e., a payment given without the intention of influence and after an act occurred).

This decision severely narrows the scope of Section 666, but the Supreme Court was clear the opinion only applies to that law. The decision begs the question: What is the potential impact of Snyder on other federal and state bribery laws?

6–3 Majority Opinion: Section 666 Is a Bribery Statute, Not a Gratuities Statute

At issue is Section 666(a)(1)(B), which criminalizes being a government official who, in that position, “corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. The particular question the Court faced was whether Section 666 criminalizes state and local officials accepting gratuities or rewards for their past official acts.

In 2013, Snyder — then the mayor of Portage, Indiana — rewarded Great Lakes Peterbilt, a local truck company, with two contracts totaling over $1 million for the purchase of trucks for Portage. In 2014, after the city purchased the trucks, Great Lakes Peterbilt paid Snyder $13,000. The Department of Justice argued the $13,000 payment in 2014 was a gratuity for the 2013 contracts and a violation of Section 666. A federal jury convicted Snyder, who appealed, arguing Section 666 did not cover gratuities. The Supreme Court agreed.

To reach its decision, the Court reviewed Section 666’s language, history, and structure, concluding its purpose was to criminalize the “corrupt state of mind and intent to be influenced in the official act.” The Court focused closely on 18 U.S.C. §201, the basis for Section 666, which forbids federal officials from accepting “anything of value” for “any official act.” In comparison, the Court found Section 666 only criminalizes “corruptly” accepting a payment “intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. The absence of a provision explicitly criminalizing gratuities, the Court reasoned, means that Section 666 only covers bribes and not gratuities. While it is a violation of Section 666 to “agree to accept payment for a future official act” or to “agree to accept a future reward for a future official act,” the Court reasoned it is not a violation of Section 666 to take an official act “before a reward is agreed to.”

The Court further opined that state and local governments offer “differing approaches” in how they handle the regulation of gratuities. Relying on “bedrock federalism principles,” the Court said it should “pause” before thinking Congress intended to prohibit “gratuities that state and local governments have allowed for their officials.” Unable to provide guidance to state and local officials on what would be an acceptable or unacceptable gratuity, the Court said the government’s reading of Section 666 would “leave state and local officials entirely at sea to guess about what gifts they are allowed to accept under federal law, with the threat of up to 10 years in federal prison if they happen to guess wrong.”

In the same vein, the Court was clear that while “a state or local official does not violate §666 if the official has taken the official act before any reward is agreed to, much less given, . . . a gratuity offered and accepted after the official act may be unethical or illegal under other federal, state, or local laws.”

What Does This Mean for Section 666?

As government enforcement defense lawyers and public officials acutely are aware, federal prosecutors often use Section 666 to prosecute state and local government officials who are allegedly involved in public corruption. The facts of every case will obviously vary, but the Snyder ruling will require the government to establish a corrupt intent to reward a public official before they act, including agreeing with the official to pay them after the deed is done. The Court’s ruling narrows the scope of prosecutable offenses to those arranged before an official act (even if paid later).

What Does This Mean for Other Anti-Corruption Laws?

The impact of Snyder, outside Section 666 cases, is less immediate. First, the Court did not rule on the meaning of “corruptly” in the statute, and it did not narrow the definition to a specific intent to violate a specific law, as the defense bar had hoped.

Second, the Snyder ruling is not a bright-line rule decriminalizing all gratuities. In fact, the Court compared Section 666 to Section 201(b) — a law criminalizing gratuities to federal officials — without referencing any issue with Section 201(b) itself. But the Court draws a clear distinction between what is a corrupt payment and what is a gratuity. This certainly will invite challenges to other anti-corruption laws that, like Section 666, do not draw a clear distinction between a corrupt payment and a gratuity. Snyder, and the reasoning underlying it, likely will influence the local, state, and federal anti-corruption landscape.

For instance, Illinois’ criminal code defines bribery in multiple ways. See 720 ILCS 5/33-1(a)(e). Each definition, however, requires the promise or payment made is with the “intent” or “understanding” that it will “influence the performance of an act” related to duties of a public official. This would, under a plain reading of Snyder, not include gratuities.

Similarly at the federal level, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits, inter alia, the “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of” a payment (or promise of payment) of money or a gift, or anything of value to any foreign official while “knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered . . . to a foreign official to influence the foreign official in his or her official capacity.” The FCPA prohibits payments to foreign officials but, like Section 666, only covers payments intended to “influence the [] official in his or her official capacity.” This, too, like Snyder would implicate the idea that a gratuity after the completion of an act is not something the FCPA intended to criminalize.