Imagine following every rule in the book only to be sued for it. That is the reality facing Monsanto, the maker of popular weedkiller Roundup, and unless the Supreme Court steps in, it could soon affect countless other businesses across the country.
At the heart of the issue is a legal battle over product labeling and whether federal law trumps state law. For years, Monsanto has faced thousands of lawsuits over Roundup. Plaintiffs’ lawyers flooded the airwaves with ads claiming glyphosate, an ingredient in Roundup, causes cancer to drum up clients, and some of these lawsuits have resulted in multi-million-dollar verdicts. However, this claim is contrary to what the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—the federal agency responsible for pesticide safety—has concluded, which is that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer in humans.
Now, the company is asking the Supreme Court to review one of these verdicts from a Missouri court that ruled Monsanto needed to include a warning label under Missouri state law, even though the EPA has explicitly said the product didn’t need such a warning label and that it wouldn’t approve one. A coalition of business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has filed a brief urging the High Court to step in. Lower courts are split on whether federal law preempts lawsuits like the Missouri suit.
Our argument is simple: if companies can be punished under state law for following federal law, then the entire system of national regulation breaks down.
The case involves a federal law called the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which governs how pesticides like Roundup are labeled and sold. FIFRA says that states cannot impose different or additional labeling requirements once the EPA approves a product label. The goal is to ensure consistency and certainty so that a product sold in Missouri does not need a different label than the same product sold in California or New York.
But the Missouri court’s decision opens the door for every state—or even every jury—to impose its own labeling rules, regardless of what federal regulators say. That creates a confusing regulatory conundrum for businesses that seek to comply with their regulatory obligations: follow federal law and risk being sued under state law, or defy federal law and try to comply with a patchwork of conflicting state demands.
It’s not just pesticide makers who should be watching this case. Many other industries rely on similar federal labeling laws to ensure nationwide consistency. Medical devices, cosmetics, over-the-counter drugs, meat, and even egg products are all regulated under federal statutes that use preemption language that is the same as, or very similar to, FIFRA’s language. If the Missouri ruling stands, companies in all these sectors could face lawsuits for not adding warnings that federal law doesn’t require—or even that it prohibits.
As a result of the contagion, businesses would inevitably face skyrocketing legal costs as plaintiffs’ lawyers seize the opportunities to sue more companies for selling lawful products. Consumers would see higher prices and fewer product choices as companies decide whether it's worth the legal and regulatory headaches to keep products on the market.
This is not about shielding companies from accountability. It’s about ensuring that when businesses follow the law, they are not punished for it by plaintiffs’ lawyers looking for new lawsuits and new revenue sources. The EPA has spent decades reviewing the safety of glyphosate. It has consistently concluded that it does not cause cancer. If courts and juries applying state law can override that judgment, what’s the point of having a federal regulatory system?
The Supreme Court now has a chance to restore clarity and fairness. By reaffirming that federal law sets the standard for product labeling, the Court can give certainty to every business that plays by the rules—and every consumer who depends on a reliable, nationwide system of regulation.
Stephen Waguespack is the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The National Law Review.