PR courts now independently evaluate agencies' legal conclusions under LPAU, following the SC's Loper Bright adoption. 

A landmark decision reshaping judicial review of agency interpretations

Recently, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico issued a landmark decision in the case Vázquez et al. v. Consejo de Titulares y Junta de Directores del Condominio Los Corales, 2025 TSPR 56, issued on May 21, 2025. In this ruling, the Court explicitly adopted the reasoning from the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244, 219 L.Ed.2d 832 (2024), to end the longstanding doctrine of judicial deference towards administrative agencies’ legal conclusions in Puerto Rico.

Historical context: The Traditional Doctrine of Judicial Deference

Historically, Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court consistently held that appellate judicial review of administrative decisions required deference to agencies’ legal conclusions. As previously established, administrative agencies’ decisions enjoyed a presumption of legality and correctness. Capó Cruz v. Jta. Planificación et al., 204 DPR 581, 591 (2020); García Reyes v. Cruz Auto Corp., 173 DPR 870, 893 (2008). The judicial deference was based upon the specialized knowledge and expertise agencies possessed regarding matters within their delegated authority. Pérez López v. Dpto. Corrección, 208 DPR 656, 673-674 (2022); Super Asphalt v. AFI y otros, 206 DPR 803, 819 (2021).

Under this framework, even when courts disagreed with an agency’s interpretation, judicial review was limited to determining if the agency’s determination was arbitrary, illegal, or unreasonable. Torres Rivera v. Policía de PR, 196 DPR 606, 628 (2016). Absent clear evidence of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the agency's determination, “the reviewing court could not substitute its own judgment for the specialized judgment of the administrative agency”. Perfect Cleaning v. Centro Cardiovascular, 172 DPR 139 (2007).

The Decisive Case: Vázquez et al. v. Consejo de Titulares y Junta de Directores del Condominio Los Corales, supra.

In Vazquez v. Condominio Los Corales, supra, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court confronted a scenario where the Department of Consumer Affairs (DACO), in a blatant abuse of discretion, issued a legal interpretation explicitly contradicting an established Supreme Court precedent in Colón Ortiz v. Asociación de Condómines B.T.I, 185 DPR 946 (2012). In Colon Ortiz, the Supreme Court had clearly determined that a condominium Administrator was an “agent” or legal representative. Nevertheless, DACO disregarded this binding Supreme Court precedent and classified the Administrator as a “contractor”, unjustifiably invoking their administrative “expertise”.

In addressing this misinterpretation, the Supreme Court carefully reviewed not only its prior jurisprudence but also examined the evolution of Puerto Rico’s administrative law statutes, particularly the shift from the former legislative framework to the current Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, Act. No. 38-2017. (LPAU).

Under the former legal regime, specifically the repealed Act. No. 170 of August 12, 1988, “Uniform Administrative Procedure Act of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” and its amendment by the also repealed Act No. 210 of December 8, 2016, “Administrative Law Reform Act”, administrative agencies’ legal interpretations explicitly merited judicial deference. Both laws mandated that legal conclusions by agencies were entitled to a presumption of correctness, emphasizing agency specialization and strictly limiting judicial substitution of judgment to instances of arbitrariness, illegality, or unreasonableness.

However, the Supreme Court highlighted that the legislative language underwent a fundamental transformation with the adoption of the current LPAU Act. No. 39-2017, explicitly removing the prior deferential language and stating clearly in Section 4.5 that “legal conclusions shall be reviewable in all aspects by the court”. In its Opinion, the Supreme Court interpreted this deliberate legislative shift and emphasized that the elimination of deferential language underscored the Legislature's intent to abandon the judicial deference toward agencies’ legal conclusions or interpretations.

Adoption of the Loper Bright Doctrine

In this same decision, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico clearly embraced the reasoning of the recent landmark decision from the United States Court, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, supra, which overturned the longstanding Chevron doctrine. Chevron had required federal courts to defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.

According to our Supreme Court’s analysis, the Loper Bright decision emphasized that statutory interpretation inherently belongs to the judiciary rather than administrative agencies. Finding the federal court’s reasoning highly persuasive, especially considering that Puerto Rico’s current LPAU closely mirrors the U.S. federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court reiterated that, while administrative interpretations may constitute informed perspectives that may guide the court, such interpretations no longer bind judicial determination. In doing so, the Supreme Court categorically underscored the shift toward judicial independence, explicitly adopting the federal position articulated in Loper Bright:

As resolved by the highest federal court, courts must exercise independent judgment when determining whether an agency has acted within the scope of its statutory authority. More importantly, contrary to the practice of recent decades, courts are no longer required to defer to an agency’s interpretation of law merely because the statute is ambiguous.

This adoption of the Loper Bright doctrine affirms a new judicial autonomy in interpreting statutory provisions, definitively ending the automatic judicial deference previously granted to administrative agencies’ legal conclusions.

Importantly, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico emphasized that this doctrinal shift specifically applies only to agencies’ legal conclusions, leaving unchanged the longstanding judicial approach toward factual determinations. Under Section 4.5 of LPAU, factual determinations made by agencies continue to be upheld by courts if supported by substantial evidence contained in the administrative record. Consequently, while courts will now exercise full independent review of legal interpretations, they will still defer to agencies’ factual determinations provided those conclusions meet the established evidentiary standard.

Practical Impact of this Doctrinal Change

This doctrinal shift significantly enhances the judiciary’s role by empowering courts to fully and independently evaluate agencies’ legal interpretations without automatic deference, thus ensuring greater accuracy in the application of the law. As a result, administrative agencies will now be compelled to justify their legal conclusions with rigorous and sound reasoning, promoting increasing accountability and transparency in their decision-making processes.

Furthermore, this enhanced judicial oversight provides business and citizens with greater legal certainty, stability, and predictability, as judicial independence promotes more consistent and uniform interpretations of statutory provisions. Ultimately, this doctrinal change reinforces judicial independence as the ultimate interpreter of statutory law, thereby solidifying Puerto Rico’s fundamental separation of power principles.

Conclusion

The recent Supreme Court decision represents a doctrinal shift, explicitly adopting the U.S. Supreme Court's Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, supra, reasoning and incorporating a thorough legislative analysis into its judicial reasoning. This decision ends automatic judicial deference exclusively toward administrative agencies’ legal conclusions, while maintaining the traditional deference to agencies’ factual determinations based on substantial evidence.