In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Texas, while specifically stating that it is not bound by the holdings of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has relied on the Federal Circuit opinions in Immunocept (IP Update, Vol. 10, No. 10) and Air Measurement (IP Update, Vol. 14, No. 8) in determining that the federal courts possesses exclusive jurisdiction for state malpractice claims “arising-under” underlying patent matters. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 653 (Supr. Ct. Tex., Dec. 16, 2011) (Green, J.) (Guzman, J., dissenting, joined by Medina, J. and Willett, J.). This decision is now at the U.S. Supreme Court as the subject of a petition for cert.

Minton is only one of a series of cases to explore the “arising under” jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The statute 28 U.S.C. §1338, which provides the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction for any civil action “arising under” federal law relating to patents, has come under extensive scrutiny lately by the Federal Circuit. In several cases in which attorney malpractice was alleged in connection with patent procurement or enforcement, Circuit Judge O’Malley has taken the opportunity to present her views on the limits of the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to hear such disputes which are grounded in state law. For example, Judge O’Malley has dissented from the dismissal of a petition seeking an en banc review of the 2010 precedential Federal Circuit opinion in Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A. (see IP Update, Vol. 13, No. 3), which found federal jurisdiction over a legal malpractice action involving missed deadlines in which no patent actually issued. Recent cases in which Judge O’Malley has aired her view on this jurisdictional issue include the following:

• Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Case No. 10-1533 (Fed. Cir., April 11, 2012) (per curiam order) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc)

• Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., Case No. 11-1178 (Fed. Cir., May 4, 2012) (Reyna, J. (O’Malley, J., concurring in the result and conceding that under controlling Federal Circuit case law, the Federal Circuit is compelled to hear the case; but explaining why, in her view, it is not “proper” to do so)

• Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, LLP, Case No. 11-1297 (Fed. Cir., April 23, 2012) (Clevenger, J.) (O’Malley, J., concurring and urging en banc consideration of the jurisdictional issue)

• Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, Case No. 11-1012 (Fed. Cir. March 22, 2012) (per curiam) (O’Malley, J., concurring in the Court’s opinion on the malpractice claim that address the issue on appeal, while noting that controlling Federal Circuit authority “compels us to do so”; but also pointing out the "federalism considerations" that mitigate against doing so)

• USSPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., Case No. 11-1525 (Fed. Cir., April 17, 2012) (per curiam) (O’Malley, J., joined by Mayer, J., concurring while voicing what she regards as “significant” federalism concerns that are raised by the Federal Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction over “these purely state laws claims”)

While Judge O’Malley, a former federal district judge who presided over more than 100 patent and trademark cases, continues to follow the binding Federal Circuit Davis precedent, it is clear that she feels that it is an incorrect application of Supreme Court case law. Both state and federal courts are applying the four-part standard enumerated by the Supreme Court in 2005 in Grable, 545 U.S. 308, for the general “arising-under” jurisdiction of §1331 to the specific patent section of §1338. In Judge O'Malley's view federal question jurisdiction, as discussed in Grable, exists if resolving a federal issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law claim; the federal issue is actually disputed; the federal issue is substantial; and federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.

Malpractice cases involving patents usually are one of two varieties involving either patent prosecution errors or non-asserted defenses during infringement litigation. Judge O’Malley tends to disagree with the application of the third Grable factor since most of the issues underlying malpractice claims are case-specific, factual inquiries and require only application, not interpretation of federal patent law and would have little or no bearing on other cases. As to the fourth factor, Judge O’Malley asserts that malpractice cases do not implicate any underlying patent rights themselves. Any patent issue that is decided will only inform the state law standards of causation or damages and would not have binding effect on other patent cases.

The majority in Minton (as well as controlling Federal Circuit case law) however, rely on the argument that a “case within a case” exists in malpractice claims, since patent issues must be analyzed in order for the plaintiff to prove a proximate causal connection that the harm or loss would not have occurred without the attorney’s malpractice. The Minton Court (like Federal Circuit precedent) is based on the rational that litigants benefit from judges who are familiar and experienced with complicated patent rules and that there is a strong federal interest in the uniform application of patent laws.

Practice Note: With the Texas Supreme Court decision in Minton currently teed up before the U.S. Supreme Court, Judge O’Malley may find her desired Federal Circuit en banc review bypassed as the issue may receive direct consideration by the Supreme Court. Certiorari briefs are currently being filed with the Supreme Court (Docket No. 11-1118). On April 26, Memorylink also filed a petition for cert to the Supreme Court drawing on Judge O’Malley’s dissent in Memorylink v. Motorola, arguing that by asserting jurisdiction on state law malpractice claims, the Federal Circuit is disturbing the appropriate balance between state and federal courts.