Bridging the Week: Jan 9 to 13, Jan 17, 2017 (Record Retention; Position Limits-Setting Authority; Overcharging Fees; Misstating Regulatory Capital) VIDEO


The Commodity Futures Trading Commission proposed a new records retention rule that attempts to be technology neutral and eliminates many current requirements that are mostly vestiges of a more paper-oriented age. In addition, the House of Representatives passed a bill early in its newest term that, if enacted, would repeal the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s controversial authority granted under Dodd-Frank to set certain position limits without an express finding of necessity and prohibit the CFTC from requesting algorithmic source code other than through subpoena. As a result, the following matters are covered in this week’s edition of Bridging the Week:

Briefly:

New Records Retention Regime for 21st Century Proposed by CFTC: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission proposed a revised records retention rule that aims to eliminate many existing antiquated requirements and to be “technology neutral” in order to accommodate future advances in recordkeeping technology. Among other things, the revised rule would eliminate the existing requirement that electronic records be maintained in their native file format and preserved exclusively in a non-rewritable, non-erasable format (commonly referred to as write once, read many or “WORM”). Instead, the revised rule would be more principles-based. Generally, regulatory records would be broadly defined to include all books and records required to be maintained by law or CFTC regulation, including all records of any correction or other amendments. For books and records stored electronically, regulatory records would also include data that shows how, when and by whom (if relevant) such “stored information was collected, created, accessed, modified or formatted” (e.g., metadata). Electronic records would have to be maintained in a manner that ensures their reliability and authenticity, and each person required to maintain regulatory records would have to create, put in place and adhere to written policies and procedures “reasonably designed” to ensure the person’s compliance with the Commission’s recordkeeping requirements. The procedures must provide for appropriate training of relevant personnel and ongoing monitoring of a firm’s compliance with its record creation and retention obligations. As now, required records would have to be retained for certain minimum enumerated time periods and be open to inspection by CFTC and Department of Justice staff. Requested documents would have to be produced “promptly” upon request by CFTC staff. The CFTC will accept comments to its proposed revised record-keeping rule for 60 days following their publication in the Federal Register.

Compliance Weeds: Just prior to the end of 2016, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority assessed a total of US $14.4 million in fines against 12 firms for “significant deficiencies” in their retention of required books and records on electronic storage media. FINRA claimed that the sanctioned firms typically did not retain electronic records in WORM format, failed to have a required audit system regarding such records, did not obtain or maintain a required attestation from a third-party vendor regarding their ability to provide data to the Securities and Exchange Commission, FINRA or any other regulator if a firm could not, and did not have adequate written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with applicable requirements. (Click here for details regarding FINRA’s actions.) Current CFTC requirements regarding electronic records are roughly equivalent to those of the SEC applicable to broker-dealers. (Click here to access CFTC Rule 1.31(b) and here to access the relevant SEC Rule, 17 CFR 240.17a-4(f).) Although the CFTC’s proposed revised record retention rule is more principles-based and technology neutral than its existing requirement, it still imposes comprehensive creation and retention requirements including rigorous controls. As the notice of proposed rule-making makes clear in referencing the ongoing training requirement under the revised rule, “[t]he obligation to remain current on the legal requirements regarding compliance with §1.31 is one that a records entity ignores at its peril. The Commission takes a similar view towards the proposed obligation for each records entity to monitor compliance with the entities policies and procedures on a ‘regular’ basis.”

My View: Last summer, Barclays Capital, Inc. agreed to pay a fine of US $800,000 to the CFTC to resolve charges that it failed to supervise it staff’s handling of exchange fees charged to customers from 2012 through 2014. According to the CFTC, after Barclays engaged an independent service provider to enhance its exchange fee reconciliation process in 2012, the provider, in August 2012, identified that the firm had failed in July 2012 to pass along to its customers discounts to ordinary fees from one exchange for one exchange-traded product. Apparently, afterwards, the firm accrued for overcharges to its customers “but failed to timely pay out $1.1 million in exchange fee rebates with respect to the discount program for this particular exchange-traded product.” The CFTC claimed that this breakdown occurred because, during the relevant time, the firm failed to implement and maintain adequate systems for reconciling invoices from exchange clearinghouses with the amount of fees actually charged to its customers. In 2014, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated also agreed to pay a fine of US $1.2 million to the CFTC related to the CFTC’s allegation that, from at least January 1, 2010, through April 2013, the firm failed to employ “an adequate supervisory system” related to the processing of exchange and clearinghouse fees charged to the firm’s customers. Although the CFTC acknowledged in both its Barclays and JPMS settlement orders that the process related to the assessment of exchange and clearing fees is “typically complicated because of the myriad applicable rates, surcharges and fee structures,” it sanctioned both firms because of their failure to catch their mistakes through a reconciliation process. Rather than bring enforcement actions against FCMs for managing the best they can with a very broken process, the CFTC should encourage exchanges to institute less complicated fee and discount structures and implement tools to help firms conduct reconciliations more easily and reliably. (Click here for background on the CFTC’s enforcement actions against Barclays and Merrill Lynch.)

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National Law Review, Volume VII, Number 17