Key Takeaways from the DOJ Antitrust Division’s Updated Compliance Guidance: It’s Not Just Criminal Anymore


The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (“Antitrust Division”) recently updated its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations guidance document (“Antitrust Compliance Guidance”). Corporate counsel and compliance officers should seriously consider these updates when crafting and implementing an antitrust compliance program.

In July 2019, the Antitrust Division announced its Policy to Incentivize Corporate Compliance and for the first time published the original Antitrust Compliance Guidance. Corporations who had previously clamored for the Antitrust Division to take its compliance efforts into account viewed the original 2019 Guidance favorably. The DOJ’s stated purpose of the Antitrust Compliance Guidance is to assist Antitrust Division prosecutors in their evaluation of compliance programs at both the charging and sentencing stage of investigations, and to provide compliance officers and the public greater transparency of the Division’s compliance analysis. The Antitrust Division’s recent updates follow similar updates to similar Compliance Guidance from the DOJ’s Criminal Division’s Guidance and updates to the DOJ’s Justice Manual.

Much of the Antitrust Compliance Guidance remains the same, but here are some key takeaways on the updates:

1. Application to Civil Antitrust Matters

The Antitrust Compliance Guidance by its very title applied to criminal antitrust investigations, but the updated documents now discusses compliance implications for civil antitrust investigations. The Division says that:

2. Compliance Should Focus on Electronic Communications

A key recent area of focus of the Antitrust Division & FTC is Preservation Obligations for Collaboration Tools and Ephemeral Messaging, so it is no surprise that several updates to the Antitrust Compliance Guidance relate to prosecutors’ expectations regarding corporate policies governing the use of personal devices and communication platforms to ensure business communications are preserved.

Specifically, in evaluating a corporate compliance programs effectiveness the Division will ask:

See Antitrust Compliance Guidance at 6.

3. AI, Pricing Tools, and Revenue Management Software

Another area the Antitrust Division has been highly focused on recently is AI, including pricing tools and revenue management software. Therefore, it is also not surprising that the Division will ask:

See Antitrust Compliance Guidance at 9.

4. Tone from the Middle, Not Just Tone from the Top

Everyone know by now that “tone from the top” is a staple of effective compliance program, but more is now expected from middle managers. Several additions to the Antitrust Compliance Guidance focus on what company management is doing to set a compliant “tone from the middle.” See Antitrust Compliance Guidance at 7. For example, the Antitrust Division notes “[a]n effective compliance program requires leadership to implement a culture of compliance at all levels of the organization,” while another defines management as “both senior leadership and managers at all levels.” Antitrust Compliance Guidance at 6.

5. Whistleblowers, Anti-Retaliation and NDAs

Deep into the updated Antitrust Compliance Guidance, under the heading “Confidential Reporting Structure and Investigation Process,” are a series of new questions that seem to focus on concerns regarding whistleblower retaliation and potential obstruction of justice. The Antitrust Division added this series of questions its prosecutors should now ask when assessing the effectiveness of an antitrust compliance program:

See Antitrust Compliance Guidance at 14.

It is unclear what is driving these updates, but the Antitrust Division is clearly concerned about efforts to deter or gag whistleblowers. It appears the Antitrust Division wants companies to specifically train employees on their CAARA rights of private civil action if they are retaliated against for reporting antitrust violations. This seems an odd burden to put on companies.

It also appears the DOJ perceives NDAs as a potential vehicle to deter whistleblowing or prevent reporting to the government. Perhaps this concern is driven by a decrease in leniency reporting to the Antitrust Division.

Neither of these things seem in the interest of companies. There are potentially more serious ramifications, including obstruction of justice consequences, for companies that prevent reporting or retaliate against whistleblower and those ramifications seem a much bigger deterrent to such acts than being denied compliance credit by the Antitrust Division. Adding these additional expectations to the very long list of questions used to evaluate the effectiveness of a corporation’s compliance program seems to unnecessarily add burden for most companies.

Will These Updates Stick in a New Administration?

With the country and Department of Justice looking toward a change of administration in 2025, many are asking whether these updates to the Antitrust Compliance Guidance will stick or be ripped up when new Department and Antitrust Division leadership arrives is 2025? Given that these recent changes are updates to a policy and guidance developed and introduced in 2019 during the first Trump Administration they are likely to stay in place. So, we will be thinking about this guidance when updating antitrust compliance policies or trainings, and focusing on electronic communications, AI, and the tone from the middle.

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National Law Review, Volume XIV, Number 320