We have been tracking the post-McKesson/Loper Bright landscape closely, specifically regarding whether a text message constitutes a “telephone call” under the TCPA’s private right of action for DNC violations.

Without Chevron deference to the FCC’s long-standing interpretation, district courts are now tasked with independently interpreting the 1991 statute. While some recent decisions interpret text messages ass not falling within the statutory definition of a “call,” a new decision out of the Southern District of Texas has ruled that it does—utilizing an odd analogy regarding farm equipment to get there.

In Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2026), SDTX Chief Judge Randy Crane denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss—holding that text messages are “telephone calls” under Section 227(c)(5).

The court looked to the ordinary meaning of the words at the time of the TCPA’s 1991 enactment. It found that the 1990 definition of “call” was broad: “to get or try to get into communication by telephone.”

To address the argument that a “telephone” must transmit sound, the court adopted the reasoning from the Seventh Circuit’s 1987 decision in In re Erickson. In that case, the court had to decide if modern farm equipment counted as a “mower” under a 1935 statute. The Seventh Circuit judge in that case reasoned then that a “mower” is not limited to the specific item available in 1935, but a “class of things that share some important feature.” Even if a mower had a stereo added to it, it was still a mower.

Applying that logic here, Judge Crane wrote:

“Just as a mower that both cuts and conditions hay is still a mower, a telephone which communicates texts and voice is still a telephone. And just as an aircraft built a hundred years from now … can be embraced by [a] 2012 statute … so can a call from a telephone built in 2025 … be embraced by a 1991 statute.”

And he ultimately concluded:

“At bottom, it is true that a telephone in 1991 was an instrument ‘for producing sounds at a distance.’ So is a telephone today. But that instrument may also send messages via ‘calls.’ Thus, to make a ‘telephone call,’ for purposes of § 227(c)(5), is to ‘to get or try to get into communication’ with an ‘instrument for producing sounds at a distance.’ A text message therefore falls reasonably within the literal language of the statute.”

This ruling stands in contrast to other recent decisions causing friction in district courts across the country. And I’m certain we will see more of these “texts are calls” or “texs are not call” rulings soon—keeping the debating ongoing.