Amidst Europe’s pushback on whistleblower laws, Theo Nyreröd, PhD, is one of the leading researchers exhorting their enforcement.  

In contrast to the United States’ pioneering role in whistleblower protection, with cases resulting in rewards of millions of dollars, European initiatives are largely absent. In an article entitled  “Myths and Numbers on Whistleblower Rewards,” Nyreröd delineates the reward programs  extensively exercised in the U.S., all of which “appear unwelcome in Europe.” While awareness has heightened in recent years, financial awards for whistleblowers have yet to be materialized.  

If the U.S. has repeatedly demonstrated the instrumental role of whistleblowers in combating corruption, what hinders Europe from following suit? In his article “Rewarding Whistleblowers to Fight Corruption?” Nyreröd puts forth two commonly voiced concerns permeating the continent: rewards promote false accusations and dissuade those with non-financial incentives. In his thesis, Nyreröd concedes that while whistleblowing appears as a “commercial transaction,”  both of these concerns, however, are “overstated” as very few such cases have been reported in the United States. There is “no evidence” that an adverse effect has arisen. The benefits ultimately outweigh the risks. 

European hesitation toward whistleblowers, Nyreröd theorizes, can instead be traced to deeply instilled cultural preconceptions. The qui tam provisions in the U.S. were originally derived from the United Kingdom, where, in the 7th century, informants received half the fine of those they reported working on Sundays. Informing became sort of a profession, Nyreröd explains. In turn,  however, civilians grew increasingly frustrated, leading to the abolition of informants in 1951  with the passing of the Common Informers Act.  

The perception of informants as a pestering annoyance has only been exacerbated. In addition to their pervasiveness throughout authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union and Nazi  Germany, during World War II, an informant’s exposure often resulted in the death of those accused. It is thus understandable, given the continent’s bloody history, why whistleblowers  acquired the unsympathetic title of “snitches.” It is important to note, however, that conflating whistleblowers with informants unjustly overlooks how the two differ. Unlike informants who serve as a tool to, often illicitly, gain information, whistleblowers work decisively to tackle corruption. Nevertheless, apprehension toward whistleblowers prevails.  

Paired with public skepticism, politicians themselves fear the implications that empowering whistleblowers entails. Nyreröd interprets Europe’s political climate as one that does not encourage risk-taking, and arming whistleblowers would pose a great risk when they point the finger at the very institutions that finance politicians.

Despite speculations of the various underpinnings, Europe’s failure to employ adequate support for whistleblowers “remains somewhat of a mystery,” Nyreröd contends. Countries around the world are adopting reward programs, except Europe. While motivations may vary, we inevitably  convene in our answer to the question Nyreröd poses: “Do we really want corrupt societies?” 

Nyreröd proposes that the next steps must be to emphasize corruption scandals and amplify public consciousness of the solution, namely bolstering whistleblowers through protection and incentives. While politicians and policymakers may be reluctant, many are simply unaware.  

Ultimately, Nyreröd’s research aims to dismantle such ignorance in an effort to combat the corruption polluting Europe.