The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Healy v. Milliman, Inc., No. 24-3327, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 71863 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026), carries significant implications for class action defense and litigation strategy across the Ninth Circuit. In certified Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes, both named and unnamed class members must present evidence of Article III standing at the summary judgment stage, not just at trial or during a post-judgment claims process. This requirement effectively shifts the standing inquiry earlier in the case, creating a meaningful opportunity to test whether a certified class includes uninjured members before trial and to recalibrate the scope of any certified class accordingly. The decision aligns summary judgment practice with the Supreme Court’s standing framework in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), and clarifies the evidentiary showing necessary to survive Rule 56 when absent-member injury is disputed.

The Decision

In 2021, in TransUnion, the Supreme Court addressed a putative class where misleading credit file flags allegedly violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). There, the Supreme Court held that only class members who suffered a concrete injury, such as dissemination of misleading reports to third parties, had Article III standing to recover damages. The Court further explained that a mere risk of future harm or the presence of internal, non-disseminated inaccuracies is insufficient to establish concrete injury for damages claims.

In Healy, the plaintiff alleged that Milliman’s consumer reports misattributed third parties’ medical records to applicants, leading to adverse underwriting outcomes, and asserted claims under the FCRA. The district court certified an “inaccuracy class” keyed to reports featuring a mismatched Social Security number and a medium or high-risk indicator. The district court later granted partial summary judgment for Milliman, requiring direct evidence of injury for absent members.

Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Sidney R. Thomas concluded that “the logic of TransUnion”requires evidence showing a genuine dispute of material fact as to standing for both named and unnamed class members at summary judgment in damages cases. The panel simultaneously corrected the district court’s approach, holding that plaintiffs may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence to meet that burden, and need only show that a rational trier of fact “could” find class-wide standing, thus rejecting any requirement to prove that a jury “necessarily” would so find. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to apply ordinary summary judgment standards to the circumstantial record.

In doing so, the Court traced TransUnion’s trial-stage standing analysis across named and unnamed class members and explained why that reasoning compels an earlier, summary-judgment-stage showing in certified damages classes. The Court also noted that pre-TransUnion Ninth Circuit authorities suggesting otherwise are no longer good law to the extent they permitted unnamed class members to avoid demonstrating standing at trial or later stages. However, the Court’s holding is limited to addressing standing requirements in cases following class certification and states that “the standing requirements for damages and equitable relief are not necessarily the same.”

Strategic Implications for Ninth Circuit Class Actions

Healy may provide earlier leverage to narrow or defeat certified classes by requiring evidence of standing in class damages cases from unnamed class members at summary judgment, empowering defendants to target overbroad classes that include uninjured members. It also adopts practical evidence standards that favor robust record-building, confirming that circumstantial evidence can suffice and signaling that both sides will intensify evidentiary development on injury-in-fact for absent members during fact and expert discovery; defendants can press summary judgment on class-wide standing while tasking plaintiffs to marshal proof showing a genuine dispute as to injury across the class. Finally, by aligning with TransUnion, the decision reduces reliance on outdated case law, expressly identifying pre-TransUnion decisions as abrogated insofar as they allowed unnamed members to avoid establishing standing in damages actions and thereby reshaping briefing and case strategy throughout the circuit.

Summary judgment is now a focal point for absent-member standing in certified damages classes, and parties should expect more defense motions challenging class-wide standing, especially after certification and before trial. Healy may also interact with predominance and manageability, as evidence that only some class members suffered concrete injury may support arguments that individualized issues predominate and support decertification or issue narrowing.