On June 23, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Blanche v. Lau that CBP officers need not have “clear and convincing evidence” of a disqualifying offense before treating a returning lawful permanent resident (LPR) as an applicant for admission under INA §101(a)(13)(C)(v). As a result, LPRs with pending charges, unresolved arrests, old convictions, or any conduct implicating INA §212(a)(2) inadmissibility grounds face increased risk of being paroled rather than admitted upon return from international travel.

To provide context, generally, LPRs returning from temporary travel abroad are not treated as “seeking admission.” Instead, they are regarded as already admitted and ordinarily do not have to reapply for admission. That default rule is subject to six statutory exceptions listed in INA §101(a)(13)(C)(i)-(vi). The exception at issue in this case applies to LPRs who have “committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2),” including certain inadmissibility offenses such as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Although CIMT is not expressly defined by statute, it generally refers to conduct that courts have treated as involving fraud, theft, or other morally reprehensible conduct, depending on the offense and applicable precedent.

The distinction carries significant practical consequences. An LPR treated as an “applicant for admission” may be found inadmissible based on a covered offense committed “at any time,” subject to the statutory requirements and any applicable exceptions.