Introduction

Sport and politics have long been considered “uneasy bedfellows”, which might explain why the regulation of sport in this country has traditionally been left in the hands of sports governing bodies (“SGBs”) rather than the UK Government.  There has, however, been a gradual shift from strict non-interventionism to a more “involved” approach to sports governance through a combination of regulation, reform and investment. This has, in turn, led to a more intertwined and complex relationship between central Government and SGBs. 

Perhaps the most obvious example of the UK Government intervening in the sports sector is the landmark Football Governance Act 2025 (the “FGA”)[1], which recently became law after receiving royal ascent on 21 July 2025. Among other things, the FGA establishes an Independent Football Regulator (“IFR”) to oversee the top five tiers of English football, implementing one of the core recommendations from the 2021 Fan-Led Review of Football Governance.  The response of the football industry (and wider public) to the FGA has been very polarising and raised several broader questions about potential long-term consequences of state regulation, as well as whether Parliament has sufficient oversight and expertise to dictate sports policy.  

This article examines (i) how and why the UK Government intervenes in sport, (ii) whether there is a limit to such intervention, and (iii) what the future might hold in this area considering recent trends. 

How does the UK Government intervene in Sport?

The notion that sport is apolitical (or politically neutral) has largely been dispelled, notwithstanding that it remains a core tenet of the Olympic Movement (as enshrined in the Olympic Charter). Indeed, whatever the ideals, all governments are involved in sports governance in some shape or form.

Since the early 20^th century, many states have shaped their national sport policies around broader domestic and foreign policy agendas.[2]  The nature of the political regime can have a significant bearing on national sport, with autocratic/totalitarian states tending to have tighter control than traditional democracies. In the UK, there are three principal means of governmental intervention in sport: (i) primary legislation, (ii) exhortation, and (iii) public funding.

Primary legislation

Implementing legislation and/or regulation is the most direct way in which the UK Government has impacted sporting activities. The FGA is perhaps the most seminal piece of sporting legislation in recent history, and is designed to (among other things) safeguard club stability and heritage, give fans a greater voice in decision-making, implement stricter owner/director tests, reallocate the financial distributions across the football pyramid, and prevent “breakaway” leagues.[3] Some critics argue that it amounts to invasive legislation that is disproportionate to the scale of issues, whereas others believe the FGA has not gone far enough (for instance, contrary to a recommendation in the 2023 Carney Review, the FGA does not cover the women’s game). 

Other areas where the UK Government has put sporting activities on a statutory footing include matters of stadium safety[4], public order[5], free-to-air broadcasting ‘listed events’[6], the hosting of major events[7], and abuse of positions of trust[8]. The latter, for example, had been subject to intense lobbying for many years to “close a legislative loophole” that existed within the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 expanded “positions of trust” laws to make it illegal for certain adults, such as sports coaches, to engage in sexual activity with 16/17-year-olds under their care or supervision.

Further, there have been recent proposals by the UK Treasury to introduce a single remote gambling tax, which would increase the 15% rate paid by bookmakers on racing to 21%, aligning it with the current rate applied to online gaming. In protest at the proposed tax rise, the British Horseracing Authority (“BHA”) cancelled four scheduled meetings on 10 September 2025.

Exhortation

One example of non-legislative intervention includes where governments apply pressure on SGBs to behave in a certain way.  In January 2025, for example, nearly 200 MPs wrote a cross-party letter to the English Cricket Board, calling on the Men’s England team to boycott an ICC Champions Trophy fixture against Afghanistan due to the “insidious dystopia” and “unconscionable oppression” in the Taliban-run country, where women and girls are banned from participating in any sport. Ultimately, the fixture went ahead but it nevertheless divided opinion within Parliament and beyond.

A similar situation arose back in 2003, when Nasser Hussain’s England cricket team forfeited a World Cup game against Zimbabwe in protest at Robert Mugabe’s regime. In that instance, politicians lobbied the England players to boycott the game, but the decision on whether to play still ultimately rested with the squad. In contrast, the Australian Government announced in 2007 that it was prepared to enact legislative measures to restrict the right of Cricket Australia to ICC-scheduled matches in Zimbabwe.

Public Funding

Governments can indirectly intervene in sport by making public funding (or public-funded benefits) available to only those who comply with government policy.  The Code for Sports Governance (the “Code”) sets out the levels of transparency, diversity and inclusion, accountability and integrity that are required from over 4,000 organisations who seek (and receive) UK Government and National Lottery funding from UK Sport and/or Sport England.  Launched in 2016 (and revised in 2021), the Code adopts a tiered approach to funding, with different requirements depending on an organisation’s size and funding level.

The financial ramifications for non-compliant sports organisations can be severe. For example, in August 2025, it was reported that the Rugby Football League may not receive its next instalment from its government funding package (worth around £16m over five years) after allegations that changes to the Board composition may have breached the Code.

Strategic investment in grassroots sport and major events has also been very much on the Government’s recent agenda as part of its so-called “Plan for Change”. In June 2025, the Secretary of State for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (“DCMS”) announced an allocation of (i) over £500m to support delivery of world class events, including UEFA Euro 2028 and the Tour de France Grand Départs, and (ii) at least £400m in new and upgraded grassroots sports facilities to “promote health, wellbeing and community cohesion”.

Why does the UK Government intervene?

How and why the central Government intervenes in sport are very different questions. As mentioned above, the UK Government has historically adopted a hands-off or light-touch approach to sports regulation. Therefore, like many northern/western European countries, UK sport has largely been left in the hands of the private sector.  There are, however, various instances where direct or indirect intervention has been considered legitimate, or even necessary. Some examples include:

• Promoting public health and civic benefits: Governments want to encourage participation in sport for public wellbeing.  Sport has many obvious health benefits (physical and mental) for the public – indeed, DCMS published a Policy Paper on 30 August 2023 titled “Get Active: a strategy for the future of sport and physical activity”, which aimed to get 2.5 million more adults and 1 million more children classified as “active” by 2030.  A healthier population falls squarely within the ambit of public policy, but Governments also recognise the community benefits of sports clubs/teams – something the Covid-19 pandemic brought into particular focus. The European Commission has also long recognised the inherent social value of sport as a “particularly effective weapon in the fight against intolerance, racism, violence, alcohol and narcotics use”.[9] In short, improving access to sport not only benefits public health, but it also sows stronger communities and captures innate social value.
• Protecting public funds: Where sports have access to public funds, it follows that the Government has a duty to ensure the money is used effectively and transparently.[10] Ensuring minimum levels of good governance, assessed against various metrics within the Code, appears to be a legitimate condition to receive public funding.
• Addressing financial instability: In some cases, sports organisations, particularly at a professional level, can face financial difficulties that threaten their viability. For instance, in November 2020, DCMS announced the Sport Survival Package to support over 1,500 sports organisations materially impacted by COVID-19 restrictions.  Government intervention may also be needed to counteract financial mismanagement, or perceived market failure. In football, for example, the Conservative Government White Paper in September 2023 noted there had “been over 60 instances of clubs going into administration since 1992, highlight[ing] the financial vulnerability of many clubs in the pyramid.” 
• Improving transparency and accountability: Although SGBs perform quasi-public functions, they are private bodies which are not subject to judicial review (albeit decisions are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the English courts[11]). Given that challenges to SGB decisions are often before confidential arbitral panels, the public generally welcome Government action to encourage transparency and stakeholder engagement in these private entities.   
• The economic multiplier effect: Hosting major sporting events in the UK is one way the Government can attract tourism (leading to increased spending in local businesses, hospitality and retail), create jobs, improve infrastructure and contribute to urban regeneration. This must, of course, be weighed against potential downsides (the financial outlay, opportunity costs, environmental impact, etc). The UK Department of Trade and Industry estimated that hosting the London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics had a £13.3bn benefit to the UK economy, which included “a highly notional £6bn of foreign direct investment after 2012 and £2.3bn from tourism over a period that actually includes the games (2011-2015).”

Is there a limit to UK Government intervention?

There is a strong tradition of self-governance in sport in the UK, such that Government intervention has generally sought to complement, rather than replace, the existing structures and rules of SGBs.  

One sporting area that the UK Government has steered well clear of is “on-field” matters. Debates around officiating, particularly in football, have remained immune from Government intervention (and rightly so). In addition to having no power over on-pitch or sporting rules, the IFR must not impact sporting competitiveness and growth and must work with existing football industry processes and league rules.

The UK Government, through the Secretary of State for DCMS, does appoint/remove key individuals from publicly funded sports bodies, such as UK Sport and Sport England, but that does not extend to traditional national governing bodies (“NGBs”). Many rules of International Federations (“IFs”) require NGBs to be independent of government, though the degree of adherence varies from country to country. For example:

• The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) requires Olympic Committees (“NOCs”) to operate independently from governments. The IOC has previously banned the likes of the Indian Olympic Association (in 2012) and the Kuwait Olympic Committee (in 2015) due to undue government interference.
• There is an express requirement in FIFA’s Statutes (Article 14.1) that “each member association shall manage its affairs independently and without undue influence from third parties”, whilst Article 15(c) further requires members “to be independent and avoid any form of political interference”.   FIFA has suspended countries in the past due to government involvement in football administration (e.g. Iraq in 2008, Nigeria in 2014, Kuwait and Indonesia in 2015, Kenya in 2022).
• FIFA’s position is echoed in UEFA’s Statutes. Article 7bis(2) specifically states that UEFA Member Associations must manage their affairs “independently and with no undue influence from third parties“, and Article 9(1bis) continues to say: “A Member Association may in particular be suspended if state authorities interfere in its affairs in such a significant way that … it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory“.  Indeed, back in September 2024, UEFA’s General Secretary reportedly wrote to Lisa Nandy (the Secretary of State for DCMS) to expressly highlight concerns about the potential for “scope creep” within the proposed IFR framework.[12]

As set out above, there have been instances where the UK Government (or cross-party MPs) have sought to influence SGBs to act in a certain manner in response to geopolitical events or decisions of IFs. However, to date, this has stopped short of direct legislative intervention.

What does the future hold?

The general consensus is that, as the social and economic status of sport has grown, so has the UK Government’s engagement with the sector.[13] What was once a strict non-interventionist approach, leaving sport regulation and governance to the private sector, has now evolved into something far more nuanced. The corollary of this is a more sinuous and, at times, strained relationship between the State and SGBs.

The “specificity of sport” is a legal concept, derived from EU law^[14], that recognises the inherent qualities and characteristics of sport. There have been suggestions that recent competition law challenges have eroded this doctrine, which has parallels with the “autonomy of sport” principle. Whilst sport does exhibit unique traits, it does not operate in a legal silo. For instance, legislation covering anti-money laundering, fraud, bribery, safeguarding, gambling, public safety, financial accountability and adherence to company/charity law have all historically impacted SGBs.^[15] The enactment of sport-specific legislation, such as the FGA, is emblematic of a more direct approach to perceived market failure.  

The financial difficulties facing professional rugby clubs (across both codes) in England and Wales have been much publicised and it remains to be seen whether calls for an independent regulator in those and/or other sports will gather momentum. However, it is notable that rugby does not touch as many constituencies across the UK as football. As a result, the appetite of MPs to push for legislation to protect community assets (i.e. professional rugby clubs) might struggle to get the same sort of traction.

For now, whether the State’s involvement in sports governance is seen as necessary intervention or unwelcome meddling in the private sector remains a matter of great debate. All eyes will be on the perceived success or failure of the IFR in the months/years ahead. David Kogan, the Chair of the IFR, has said that the IFR will have “quite a lot of teeth” but is designed to be “light touch” with a “relatively lightweight bureaucracy”. Time will tell.

[1] The long title of the Football Governance Act 2025 is: “A bill to establish the Independent Football Regulator; to make provision for the licensing of football clubs; to make provision about the distribution of revenue received by organisers of football competitions; and for connected purposes.”

[2] Jedlicka, S. R., Harris, S., & Reiche, D. (2020). State intervention in sport: a comparative analysis of regime types. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 12(4), 563–581. https://doi.org/10.1080/19406940.2020.1832134

[3] Critics have, however, raised concerns about how the FGA could threaten clubs’ autonomy, increase bureaucracy and regulatory burden (especially on clubs with less staff and resource), deter investors, lead to a closed shop of top clubs, etc.

[4] For example, the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (establishing a licensing system for grounds with capacity for more than 10,000 spectators) and the Football Spectators Act 1989 (implementing additional safety measures, in response to the 1989 Hillsborough tragedy).

[5] For example, the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol, etc) Act 1985 and the Football Spectators Act 1989.

[6] For example, the Broadcasting Act 1996, the Communications Act 2003 and the Media Act 2024. Under the latter, the listed events regime – which ensures the free broadcast coverage of certain major sporting or other events of ‘national interest’ (as designated by the Secretary of State) – will include any services which can be used to show live coverage, including on-demand platforms, internet-based streaming services, etc. 

[7] For example, the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006, which provided the legislative framework to host the 2012 Games.

[8] For example, section 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2023 (as amended). The expansion of “positions of trust” to include sports coaches was a response to a Ministry of Justice review and stakeholder engagement, including campaigning groups like the NSPCC.

[9] European Commission, ‘The Development and Prospects for Community Action in the Field of Sport’ (Brussels, 29 September 1998) https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/library/documents/doc252_en.pdf

[10] Kučera, J., Zimková, E., Nemec, J., & Nemec, M. (2023). A comparative analysis of the efficiency of public funding policies for sports in the European Union. Cogent Social Sciences, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2280335

[11] Nagle v Fielden [1966] 2 QB 633, as affirmed in Bradley v Jockey Club [2005] EWCA Civ 1056.

[12] As reported in The Guardian, the letter stated: “While the initial intent of the IFR is to oversee the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets, there is always a risk that, once established, the IFR may expand its mandate beyond these areas.” (Sean Ingle, ‘England will not face Euros expulsion for having regulator, key officials say’, The Guardian, 15 September 2024: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2024/sep/15/england-will-not-face-euros-expulsion-for-having-football-regulator-key-officials-say)

[13]Adam Lewis KC and Jonathan Taylor KC, Sport: Law and Practice (4th Ed., London: Bloomsbury, 2021), para..A3.60

[14] For example: C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman ([1995] ECR I-4921; C-519/04 Meca Medina & Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991.

[15] ICSA Report, ‘The future of Sports Governance; Beyond Autonomy’ (May 2019)