Sifuentes v. Capital One:

First, a pro se Plaintiff sued Defendant Capital One in 2022. See Sifuentes v. Capital One, No. 2:22-cv-00190-JCB, 2025 WL 2772185, at *1 (D. Utah Sept. 26, 2025). Among his claims was an alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). His original Complaint was dismissed with leave to amend for failing to state any claims.

In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, he asserts violations of the TCPA alongside claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Michigan Consumer Protection Act, and state tort law, which also failed to survive scrutiny. Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett found the Amended Complaint stated no viable federal claims and that further amendment would be futile. He dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Judgment was entered, and the case closed.

But Plaintiff then filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from judgment, arguing his “limited resources” meant the Court shouldn’t fault him for citing the wrong law or not providing cases. He claimed a right under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) to voluntarily dismiss the entire case without prejudice because Defendant Capital One hadn’t filed an answer or summary judgment motion.

The Court rejected this reasoning, stating that limited resources and pro se status don’t constitute “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1). Plaintiff didn’t make an excusable litigation mistake, but instead failed to plead viable claims. Ok, end of story? Afraid not.

Plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit and simultaneously filed a second Rule 60(b) motion, raising the same limited-resources argument and presenting new claims regarding diversity jurisdiction, while arguing that the judgment was void. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, conducting its own review and concluding the Amended Complaint failed to establish diversity jurisdiction.

The District Court denied the second motion, treating it as an improper motion for reconsideration. Some arguments had already been raised and rejected, while others could have been raised initially but weren’t. A third motion followed with the same result. Plaintiff appealed again. The Tenth Circuit affirmed again. See a pattern? Like a horror sequel with too many installments, the motions just kept coming…

Then came a fourth motion for relief from judgment, presenting “entirely new arguments” without explaining why they couldn’t have been raised in the first motion. Sifuentes, 2025 WL 2772185 at *2. Under the Tenth Circuit, motions for reconsideration are “inappropriate vehicles to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Unless extraordinary circumstances exist, “the basis for the second motion must not have been available at the time the first motion was filed.” Id.

Since Plaintiff’s arguments could have been raised initially, his fourth motion was procedurally improper. As such, the Court denied it and warned that further meritless motions could result in filing restrictions.

So the takeaway is pretty straightforward. If you’re going to move for reconsideration or Rule 60 relief, make sure you bring every viable argument the first time (that’s why our clients turn to us for defense).

Next up, we have another matter involving an alleged robocall scheme and piercing the corporate veil.

State of Ohio ex rel. Att’y Gen. Dave Yost v. Jones:

While Sifuentes shows what not to do, State of Ohio ex rel. Att’y Gen. Dave Yost v. Jones demonstrates how to adequately plead TCPA claims against individual and corporate defendants who hide behind corporate entities. This gets spicy.

For quick background, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost filed suit against a network of robocallers, alleging at least 800 million deceptive call attempts orchestrated through a deliberately complex web of shell companies. See State of Ohio ex rel. Att’y Gen. Dave Yost v. Jones et. al, No. 2:22-cv-02700, 2025 WL 2772466, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2025). The Complaint alleged violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(g); the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act; the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”); the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“CSPA”), and the Ohio Telephone Solicitation Sales Act (“TSSA”).

According to the Complaint, Defendants delivered prequalified leads by initiating robocalls that advertised various goods or services. When possible, they facilitated a live transfer of the consumer to their clients while keeping the individual on the line. The scheme involved “Call Originator Defendants,” who allegedly initiated hundreds of millions of robocalls, and “Financial Shell Defendants,” who obtained bank accounts to facilitate payments from clients. These accounts were used to disburse proceeds to the individual defendants and to fund the services necessary for the continued operation of the alleged robocall enterprise.

Two individual Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff’s Complaint improperly lumped all Defendants together without specifying who did what and failed to adequately allege facts supporting corporate veil piercing. Result? The Court denied their Motion.

On the group pleading challenge, the Court explained that “collecting defendants under a single defined term is permissible and, on its own, is not a basis for dismissal.” Gold Crest, LLC v. Project Light, LLC, 525 F. Supp. 3d 826, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2021). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), all a Plaintiff needs to do is to give Defendants “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Here, the Complaint didn’t just vaguely allege wrongdoing by an undifferentiated group. It separately identified each Defendant, described their independent conduct, their role in the case, and their relationship with each other. One Defendant was alleged to have received the majority of the proceeds from the scheme, acted as a signatory on bank accounts for corporate Defendants, and obtained over $430,000 from those accounts! The other Defendant allegedly opened financial accounts used in the alleged robocall scheme, signed contracts furthering the operation, and received substantial funding. The Court found that these individualized allegations provided Defendants with adequate notice under Rule 8(a).

On the veil-piercing question, the Court applied Ohio’s three-part test. Under Ohio law, courts may disregard the corporate form when: (1) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was so complete that the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own; (2) control over the corporation was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity; and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted from such control and wrong. Taylor Steel, Inc. v. Keeton, 417 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2005).

For the first element, Ohio Courts look to factors such as inadequate capitalization, failure to observe formalities, insolvency, holding oneself out as personally liable, diversion of funds, missing records, and the use of a corporate façade. Id. Here, the Complaint’s allegations lined up neatly: a “maze” of interrelated entities under common control, shared resources (including Internet Protocol addresses) and commingled funds, shutting down and spinning up new entities when sued, and noncompliance with corporate and FCC registration requirements. Jones, 2025 WL 2772466 at *5.

Regarding the second element involving fraud or illegal act, Ohio applies the standard cautiously, defining “wrongdoing” broadly to include harmful or unjust acts, not only crimes. Taylor Steel, 417 F.3d at 608. Here, the Complaint alleges a robocall scheme that violates the TCPA, TSR, CSPA, and TSSA, with Defendants exercising control, personally funding the infrastructure (domain/cloud server), opening/controlling accounts, and signing contracts used in the operation. Jones, 2025 WL 2772466 at *6–7.

Lastly, for the third element injury/unjust loss, Ohio sues on behalf of residents harmed by hundreds of thousands of deceptive robocalls, tying that harm to defendants’ control of the entities. Id. at *7. Accepting the well-pleaded facts, the Court held the Corporate Defendants were mere instrumentalities and denied judgment on the pleadings on veil-piercing grounds (while declining to reach “common enterprise” or “personal participation” theories not raised by the motion). Id. at *6–7.

These cases offer us a glimpse into the complexities of TCPA litigation. On one end, endless meritless motions can sink a case. On the other hand, detailed allegations of fraud and control can keep both individual and corporate defendants tied to a robocall scheme involving at least 800 million calls. Talk about scale.