The Delaware Court of Chancery recently dismissed a complaint based on false allegations verified as true in a complaint, as well as fabricated documents and misrepresentations to the court, in Govette v. Bongiovani, C.A. No. 2019-0139-NAC (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 2025).

Although this case might involve extreme facts, and enunciates basic principles that might seem too obvious to require emphasis, still this opinion remains noteworthy for underscoring fundamental precepts on which the litigation process depends.

Candor is the overarching theme buttressing the fundamental principles that this decision explains. The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice based on the following wrongful actions:

• Making knowingly false allegations in a verified amended complaint.
• Attaching fabricated documents to the amended complaint.
• Testifying falsely at his deposition and at an evidentiary hearing, and,
• Evidencing a lack of candor in declarations submitted to the court.

These transgressions, many of which were admitted at a later stage of the case, were proven by clear and convincing evidence and violated Court of Chancery Rule 3(c) in connection with false allegations in the amended complaint and false documents attached thereto. The court concluded that it was compelled to dismiss the complaint based on Rule 41(b).

Background

• The plaintiff founded the company involved and managed it initially, but then gave up some stock ownership in connection with subsequent investors joining the company. The founder did not observe corporate formalities and did not maintain records of his stock ownership. He attempted to address his lack of documentation to establish his stock ownership by making misrepresentations and creating false documents, as well as testifying untruthfully in a deposition and at a court hearing.
• The defendants were able to prove through a digital forensic expert that the documents created by the plaintiff were drafted with software that was unavailable on the date that the plaintiff claimed that the documents were created. An initial motion to dismiss was denied in order to allow discovery into the factual basis for the false allegations and false documents.
• Notably, the court observed that in these circumstances a second motion to dismiss was not barred.

Highlights

The most memorable legal principles articulated in this decision that have the most widespread applicability for corporate and commercial litigators, as well as litigators in general, include the following key points.

• In response to an argument that the renewed motion was untimely, the court noted that the motion to dismiss was filed within the ten days required to respond to an amended complaint under Rule 15(a)(6). Specifically, under Rule 6, when computing any time period that is less than eleven days, the intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the time computation.
• Dismissal for “failure of the plaintiff to comply with” the Chancery rules may be filed without any time limitation under Rule 41(b). See footnote 50.
• The court explained that a litigant violates Rule 3(c) when they include “false allegations verified as true in a pleading.” That violation is not a mere technicality because: “it undercuts the integrity of the judicial process.” Slip op at 14.
• The court has the inherent authority to police and penalize serious abuses of the judicial process, including “a party’s lack of candor.” Id. at 15. (emphasis added) See also footnote 86.
• The plaintiff admitted that he fabricated documents and filed false allegations to “make a better case” for himself.
• The impact of untrue or inconsistent statements on the credibility of a witness, such as a “determination that a party has been untruthful, of course, affects the credibility of his whole testimony and lying on one issue invariably impairs one’s chances of prevailing on any other disputed point.” Footnote 94.
• The court also underscored that: “When a witness makes inconsistent statements, it becomes fodder for impeachment and an issue to consider when evaluating the witness’s credibility.” Id.
• The court reasoned that: “When a plaintiff comes to this court seeking equity, they are expected to do equity by the other parties to the case and to the court itself, by being candid.” Slip op. at 19. (emphasis added).
• The court cited prior decisions where dismissal was warranted under Rule 41(b) when pleadings “contain false allegations verified as true.” Slip op. at 20 and footnote 109.
• The court explained that the plaintiff evidenced a lack of “the candor required by those
• who resort to the judicial process.” Id. at 20. (emphasis added)
• The court cited to prior decisions which found that a lack of candor and false statements warrant the admittedly harsh sanction of dismissal because, as in this matter, such transgressions mean that such a party: “forfeited his right to equity by his own inequitable conduct.” Footnote 114.
• The court buttressed its reasoning by observing that the lack of candor by the plaintiff directly allowed this litigation to continue, which forced the defendants to engage in repeated and time-consuming efforts to uncover the full extent of his falsities and contributed to the years-long delay in resolving this case. Slip op at 21.
• The court provided public policy reasons for its decision by insisting that the plaintiff’s “recurrent lack of candor, . . . committed a wrong against this institution and threatened the integrity of this court . . .. And, allowing the “plaintiff to proceed with this suit would encourage other parties to play fast and loose with the truth when speaking to this court.” Slip op at 21 and footnotes 117 and 118. (emphasis added)
• The court quoted from prior decisions, which relied on basic principles such as: “When a party knowingly misleads a court of equity in order to secure an unfair tactical advantage, it should forfeit its right to equity’s aid. Otherwise, sharp practice will be rewarded, and the tradition of civility and candor that has characterized litigation in this court will be threatened.” Also: “The court is so jealous in guarding itself against such misuse that it will sua sponte apply the  maxim whenever it discovers the unconscionable conduct.” See footnote 119.
• The court concluded that if it excused the misconduct in this case, it would “have unacceptable negative policy ramifications for future proceedings.” Slip op at 23.