CFTC Proposes Federal Regulatory Framework for Leveraged Retail Crypto Trading
Thursday, October 8, 2026

Earlier this week, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC” or the “Commission”) issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (the “ANPRM”) describing its intent to build a federal regulatory framework for retail crypto asset transactions involving margin, leverage or financing, and to create a new category of CFTC-regulated trading venue, the Crypto Asset Market (“CAM”). The initiative is titled Regulation Crypto Asset Transactions (“Regulation CTX”) and Regulation Crypto Asset Markets (“Regulation CAM”). 

The CFTC does not assert new jurisdiction in the ANPRM; rather, the agency is proposing to formalize in a rulemaking a legal theory the CFTC has pursued through enforcement for years. Section 2(c)(2)(D) of the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”), added in 2010, has long required “retail commodity transactions” involving margin, leverage or financing to trade on designated contract markets (“DCMs”) unless an exception applies. The Commission began enforcing that requirement against both centralized exchanges and decentralized crypto protocols in 2021 and 2022 for offering this kind of “off-exchange” trading (i.e., without DCM registration). 

The Commission never built the registration categories, listing standards or intermediary structure a crypto exchange would need to operate on-exchange, so enforcement was the only tool it had. Chairman Selig has acknowledged that although Congress has long required exchanges offering this kind of trading to register with the CFTC, the agency “never used this authority to issue purpose-fit rules for these transactions or platforms, only to enforce.” The ANPRM is the Commission’s first attempt to close that gap. 

An ANPRM is a preliminary step that precedes a formal proposed rule: rather than publishing draft regulatory text for comment, the Commission is describing its current thinking and inviting public input that will inform whichever rule it ultimately proposes. Comments are due 60 days after the ANPRM’s publication in the Federal Register, and the Commission has said it will use the comments to shape that next, more formal rulemaking.

I. A Three-Tier Market Structure

The ANPRM creates a distinct regulatory category for retail crypto trading conducted on a margined, leveraged or financed basis (a “CTX,” short for crypto asset transaction). Chairman Selig described the underlying framework, in remarks delivered the same day, as a three-rung ladder: ordinary spot trading (Rung 1), CTXs (Rung 2), and trading in perpetual contracts and other derivatives (Rung 3). The ANPRM addresses Rung 2.

For a crypto exchange, this is not a new legal requirement. Leveraged retail crypto trading is already required to occur on a registered exchange under the CEA, as the Kraken and Ooki DAO enforcement actions discussed above show. DCM registration, the core-principle listing standards, and FCM intermediation all already exist and apply to digital asset commodities, but the Commission has not previously adapted them to the specifics of crypto markets. The ANPRM proposes to do that through the CAM structure described below. A venue seeking to offer CTXs would need to operate within the CFTC’s existing regime for designated contract markets (“DCMs,” the CFTC-registered exchanges on which futures and other derivatives are traded), either as a conventional DCM or, for a venue dealing exclusively in CTXs, as a new CAM. Existing DCMs that already list derivatives would be able to add CTX trading under tailored rules the Commission intends to propose.

Chairman Selig was careful to describe the framework as a federal “option,” not a mandate, analogizing it to the choice between a state or federal bank charter. The Commission cannot, on its own, require all crypto exchanges to register with the CFTC; only Congress can do that. Exchanges that do not offer margined, leveraged or financed retail trading could continue operating under state licensing regimes, while those that want to offer such products would have a federal pathway designed for crypto markets rather than the legacy futures-exchange model.

II. CAM: A New Registration Category for Crypto-Only Venues

The ANPRM would create the CAM as a new subcategory of DCM registration under Section 5 of the CEA, which sets out twenty-three statutory core principles applicable to DCMs. A CAM would remain subject to those core principles but would operate under a tailored set of implementing rules (the “CAM Core Principles”) designed around exchanges dealing exclusively in CTXs. An exchange offering only CTXs could elect the CAM framework instead of registering as a conventional DCM; an exchange that also lists futures, options or swaps would remain within the ordinary DCM framework, with CTX-specific rules layered on top. The Commission has also signaled that it expects CAMs to retain the integrated structures common in the crypto industry today: the ANPRM would permit a CAM to register concurrently as an FCM (futures commission merchant, the CFTC-regulated intermediary that holds and manages customer funds) and a derivatives clearing organization, rather than compelling a hard separation into unaffiliated, single-function entities.

The ANPRM also translates existing DCM core principles into crypto-specific terms. Core Principle 3 prohibits a DCM from listing contracts that are “readily susceptible to manipulation.” For crypto assets, the ANPRM itself identifies four factors relevant to that analysis: (i) the available or circulating supply free of transfer restrictions, and related liquidity dynamics; (ii) the economic, operational and governance control of the underlying blockchain system; (iii) whether the system’s source code is open source and publicly available; and (iv) the reliability, resilience and security of the system. Separately, in his remarks accompanying the ANPRM, Chairman Selig illustrated how those statutory factors might play out in practice, citing considerations such as a token’s distribution method and concentration among holders, lock-up periods and vesting schedules for insiders, and programmatic issuances or buybacks, among “a
flurry of other crypto asset-specific considerations.” For an exchange, this points toward a materially more formal listing process, one that documents tokenomics (a token’s supply, distribution and incentive design), insider concentration, unlock schedules and governance arrangements, rather than relying on trading volume alone as a proxy for integrity.

III. Required FCM Intermediation

Among the most consequential features of the proposal is the required intermediation of CTXs by a registered FCM. Rather than a direct customer-to-exchange relationship, the model under consideration interposes a registered FCM between the retail customer and the CAM or DCM. That FCM would manage customer accounts and funds and would be subject to existing CEA customer-protection requirements covering disclosures, capital and segregation of customer property, though the Commission is also contemplating a modified FCM regime calibrated to the commercial realities of crypto intermediation, potentially as a distinct subcategory of FCM registration. The requirement also serves a second purpose: it would bring customer-facing CAM activity within the Bank Secrecy Act’s anti-money-laundering, customer-identification and suspicious-activity-reporting regime, which does not uniformly apply under today’s state money-transmission licensing. That BSA rationale is a significant part of why the Commission favors this structure, not a side effect of it.

For many crypto exchanges, particularly those in which the exchange itself onboards customers, holds customer funds, extends financing, executes trades, manages margin and liquidates positions, mandatory FCM intermediation would require substantial restructuring of those existing arrangements rather than a simple registration filing. Under the structure the ANPRM describes, financing could be extended only by an “eligible leverage provider,” defined as the intermediating FCM itself or a qualified banking institution the FCM sponsors, and the intermediating FCM would custody the purchased crypto asset. The leverage provider may obtain a security interest in the customer’s account containing the purchased crypto asset or in other collateral. The ANPRM separately notes that, under the current FCM regulatory framework, a customer’s creditor cannot hold a security interest in the assets in an FCM’s segregated account; as a matter of analysis (not something the ANPRM states outright), that constraint suggests any security interest taken by a leverage provider over the segregated assets themselves would need to be structured to work around that limitation. The Commission has invited comment on how FCM requirements should be adapted to crypto activity while preserving clear lines of responsibility for customer property, recordkeeping and supervision.

IV. Proof of Reserves

The ANPRM also raises a possible proof-of-reserves obligation for CAMs that hold customer property in omnibus accounts (pooled customer accounts not allocated to individual customers), a practice the Commission describes as typical among crypto exchanges today. This is a topic for comment, not a settled requirement: the ANPRM notes that some exchanges already obtain a third-party auditor’s attestation that their reserves are sufficient to cover customer liabilities (commonly called “proof of reserves”), and it asks which such practices, including blockchain-based verification methods, the Commission should consider incorporating into the CAM framework. This would go beyond ordinary segregation, which requires only that customer property be held separately from the exchange’s own assets, to a requirement that the exchange affirmatively demonstrate that the crypto assets backing its customer obligations actually exist. Exchanges using omnibus wallets, affiliated custodians, rehypothecation arrangements or staking programs should expect this topic to receive close attention.

V. Actual Delivery and Custody Design

The ANPRM also proposes a crypto-specific interpretation of “actual delivery” under the retail commodity transaction exception in Section 2(c)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA. The 28-day actual-delivery concept is not new, and neither is crypto-specific guidance on it. Section 2(c)(2)(D)(ii) has long excepted from the on-exchange requirement any contract that results in actual delivery within 28 days, and in 2020 the Commission issued interpretive guidance applying that exception specifically to crypto assets. The Commission withdrew that 2020 guidance in late 2025, citing the rapid evolution of crypto technology and the recommendations of the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets; the then-Acting Chairman described it as “outdated and overly complex.” The ANPRM proposes a new interpretation to take its place, and the two differ mainly in scope: the 2020 guidance addressed actual delivery on a stand-alone basis, with no surrounding market-structure framework, while the current proposal folds actual delivery into the broader CAM and FCM-intermediation structure and ties the 28-day standard explicitly to wallet custody and control rather than leaving it to case-by-case analysis.

Courts, including the Ninth Circuit in CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., have held that actual delivery requires transfer of a meaningful degree of possession or control, and the Commission preliminarily reads that standard, applied to crypto assets, to turn on whether a customer obtains the credentials needed to control the wallet holding the asset. The ANPRM states that delivery to an external, non-custodial wallet (a wallet whose private keys the customer alone controls, as opposed to one held by the exchange) within 28 days generally would satisfy the exception, while an asset left on the exchange’s internal book-entry would not. For businesses, this gives a clearer design target for transactions intended to remain outside the CTX framework: genuine transfer of the asset to a wallet the customer controls, rather than merely crediting an internal exchange balance, should be treated as part of the regulatory design of the product rather than an afterthought.

VI. Market Infrastructure, Surveillance and Conflicts

The CAM regime would also apply the DCM core principles addressing market surveillance, conflicts of interest and system safeguards (Core Principles 3, 4, 11, 12, 16 and 20), adapted to crypto markets. On surveillance, the Commission is weighing whether a CAM should be required to integrate pricing and trading data from offshore venues, and how the continuous, 24/7 nature of crypto trading should affect obligations designed around markets with defined trading sessions. The conflicts principles are also likely to matter more for crypto businesses, which frequently combine functions that are structurally separated in traditional markets, such as operating an exchange, a broker-dealer, a custodian, a lender, a market maker, a token issuer and a staking business within a single corporate group.

VII. Implications by Business Model

The impact of the ANPRM varies by business model, and the cleanest way to see it is as three categories rather than a single spectrum. A venue offering only unleveraged spot trading, where every transaction either involves true actual delivery or simply falls outside Section 2(c)(2)(D) altogether, sits outside the proposed CTX/CAM structure entirely and can continue operating under state licensing regimes; for these firms, moving into the federal framework later is a strategic choice, not a compliance necessity. A spot transaction that qualifies for actual delivery is not subject to the on-exchange requirement at all; a retail commodity transaction involving margin, leverage or financing falls within Section 2(c)(2)(D) regardless of delivery timing. These are distinct concepts and should not be conflated. An exchange that already offers retail margin or leverage sits in the second category and is the most directly affected: for that exchange, the ANPRM could change the business model itself, well beyond an added registration filing. An existing DCM that already lists crypto derivatives sits in the third category and would have a more direct path to adding CTXs under the Commission’s intended tailored rules, while a venue that wishes to offer both CTXs and other derivatives would remain subject to the ordinary DCM framework rather than the narrower CAM category.

VIII. Next Steps

Although the ANPRM does not itself impose any compliance obligations, it provides enough detail for affected businesses to begin preparing. Firms should take stock of every U.S. product involving margin, leverage, deferred payment or other financing and consider how each would fit within the proposed CTX framework, including whether an existing financing counterparty could qualify as an eligible leverage provider or would need to be restructured as, or routed through, an FCM. Custody architecture should be evaluated closely, since the proposed actual-delivery standard turns on precisely when and how a customer obtains possession and control of the underlying crypto asset, including through external wallets, omnibus wallets, multisignature arrangements, staking and governance rights, and security interests.

Firms should assess whether an existing FCM relationship could support the contemplated business model, and prospective CAM applicants should begin considering the governance, surveillance, conflicts and systems controls a DCM-grade registrant would need. Existing token-listing policies should be measured against the four statutory manipulation-risk factors the ANPRM identifies for Core Principle 3 purposes, and exchanges should weigh the strategic choice between remaining within a state-regulated model and pursuing federal registration to offer retail leveraged or financed crypto products nationally.

Separately, Chairman Selig has indicated that the Commission is also examining a functional approach to intermediary status for software developers who do not solicit orders, control execution or hold customer assets, stating that a person should not have to register as an introducing broker merely because the person “shipped code”; that signal is worth tracking by decentralized venues and their developers even though it falls outside the formal CTX and CAM proposals. Given the number of specific questions the
Commission has posed throughout the ANPRM, firms should also consider submitting comments, since the Commission has indicated the responses it receives will shape the eventual rulemaking.

IX. Outlook

The ANPRM is an effort to build the federal market infrastructure that has so far been missing for retail leveraged crypto trading, converting an enforcement-based legal theory into purpose-built rules. For an affected exchange, the central consequence is that retail leverage would no longer be simply a product feature layered onto a spot platform: under the framework the Commission is contemplating, offering it would move the business into a different federal market structure, with a regulated venue, a regulated
intermediary, a customer-property regime, surveillance infrastructure and product-governance requirements of its own. The ANPRM is only the first step in that process, and the formal rulemaking that follows will depend substantially on the comments the Commission receives within the 60-day window.

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